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I ,, ,:il.; 1 :'/1 l1.c iJ , f tC ! ravided a i :~ .an t  of'  $1.46,500 t o  tile Andri:r, - - . . i :?! l.';? c:: v:  ,-j!l;i:el? ~?on t  ji  !:?'OZI'?A!:L':C of' rc?.;o~lr~(i t o  cur r i ed  ou t  
,;; :.;. in :;::: i .c~rt o!" ~i'l'bl:.!: t t r  ( ~ C V C I  LIP the Flict 'o pol ic ie3  f o r  techlLolog;r. 
r- , ; .dried of t : .~ grant  \.tilS sub:;cq~entl.y ~ x t e r ~ d o d  t o  twenty-one months and 
t);e filranciol l i f e  fol' t h i 3  PhhSe 1 pl'ojcct Was clo3ed i n  October 1973. 
A Pi,ose I1 grant  wns crpprovod by the  IljRC Bawd of Governors i n  March 19TJ. 
This ttas f o r  $275,050 over t h r ee  years ,  and WHS t o  be matched by $390,000 
a l located f o r  technoloey pol icy  work by t h e  Junta  of t he  Andean Pact .  
The s t a r t  of Phase I1 was dcluyed u n t i l  January 1974, and t he  f i n i s h i n g  
date wus expected t o  be December 1976. 
I n  June 1976, D r .  Constantine Voitsoe , Director  of t h e  Technology 
Policy Group s ince  its incept ion,  l e f t  the  Junta  t o  take  up an IDRC Sen ior  
Research Associate Award. D r .  Luis Soto-Krebs wcls appointed t o  be h i s  
successor. A t  t h e  timo of t h e  IDRC review, i n  December 1976, Dr .  Soto  was 
re f  ornula t ing t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  of t h e  Divia i  on and subsequently i n  February 
1977 requested t h e  approval of t h e  Centro f o r  a r ea l l oca t i on  of funds ,  and 
an e ighteen month extension of t h e  time period. 
* 
On December 13th and 14th  1976, an  IDRC review panel met i n  Lima with 
members of t he  Junta  of t h e  Andean Pact ,  and with s t a f f  of t h e  Pac t ' s  
Technology Policy Programme, t o  review t h e  work ca r r i ed  ou t  during t h e  
Phase I1 project .  The i n i t i a l  arrangemonts f o r  t h i s  review were made with 
Dr.  Vnitsos p r i o r  t o  h i s  depur ture  from t h e  Jun ta ,  and t he  f i n a l  de t a i l ed  
arrangements were made by D r .  Soto. 
Following prel iminary d i scuss ion  i n  Ottawa i n  October, t h e  IDRC 
Review Fnnel met on its own i n  Lima on t h e  evening of December 12 th  t o  
agree on t h e  c r i t i c a l  i s sue s  f o r  discussion.  On t h e  morning of 13th  December 
we met with Sr.  Luis Barundiurtln from Peru who is Chairman of the  Junta,** and 
with h i s  co-member, S r .  Alberto Fernandez, who is  from Venezuela. This  was a 
br ie f  meeting at which we were welco~aed, and gave an explanat ion of  t h e  
purpose of t he  evaluation.  We met twice more with the  Junta  - once as t h e i r  
luncheon guests  a t  t h e  National Club, and f i n a l l y  i n  a p r i va t e  sess ion  at the  
conclusion of the  review, when we reported on our  impressions. Mr. Rafael  
GarciaVelasco, from Equador, t he  t h i r d  member of the  Jun ta ,  wm a l s o  present  
at  t h e  luncheon meeting. 
* The panel' p a r t i c i pan t s  wore: D r .  Louis Berl inguet ,  Senior Vice Pres ident ;  
D r .  Geoffrey Oldham, Associate Director ,  Science and Technology Po l icy  . 
Programme, SS and HR Divis ions ,  and Nr. Martin Be l l ,  Sen ior  Programme 
Advisor, Science and Technology Pol icy  Programme. 
** The pr inc ipa l  dec i s ion  making and nego t ia t ing  body of t h e  Andean Pact  i s '  
t h e  Commission. This is made up of represen ta t ives  of each of the  na t iona l  
governments acceding t o  t he  Acuerdo de  Cartagona. I n  e f f e c t  i t s  various 
Decisions. c o n s t i t u t e  i n t e rna t i ona l  t r e e t i e s  between t h e  member states. 
The S e c r e t a r i a t  of t h e  Pact is based i n  Lima and is headed by a th ree  man 
Junta. The term of t he  Junta  is  t h r ee  years  and each member s e rve s  as 
chairman f o r  one year  of his t h r ee  year  term. 
ur.. So Lo cr,r~..icc! thi. !.;:,il: L i ~ r d c ! ~  01' ]lr.cscr:tin,: t11c work of t l , i :  P ~ ~ , ; ~ , ,  
J D j . ) l ~ d  by l.r.!u cii.::Lc I..; ol' t l ! ~  teal:, f'or Ciucus~lioijs of t h e i r  ~j:irti(.lj\ .  , 
crer~s vlurk - lj,., 1;:rrceIo ' j . l~, i ;~i l :~ ( forco t ry  and fo re s t  products tc.cl.no.lc,::-) 
D r .  1.lex Tr ie rs  (l.'ood t ~ . ~ i i r i o ' l ~ ~ ~ ) .  111 nilditlon, Conutantiue Vii i t~o:;  
wirs yrescllt f o r  ~ o s t  of' the ci i : ; :x~ssion~. 
We a r e  extrealoly g ra t e fu l  to  the  rrien~Lcrs of t he  Junta  and t o  D r .  Soto 
and h i s  colleagues for t he  time tlioy made ava i lab le ,  f o r  t h e i r  frankness 
and helpfulness during discucoion, and, no 1 l e a a t ,  f o r  t h e i r  hosp i t a l i t y .  
We a re  a s s i s t ed  i n  our  rcviow by the  IDRC Regional Off ice  i n  Bogota. 
They provided us  with a very usefu l  revicu of the  or ig ins  and h i s to ry  o'f 
tho Andeon Pact, includine a11 n~sessment  of t he  currant c r i s i s  and f u t u r e  
prospects. We a l s o  received he lpfu l  corments from t h e  P ie ld  Coordinator 
of t he  IDRC-supported Science and Technolotry Pol icy Instruments Project  
and h i s  s t a f f  i n  Lima. Their  colnments and views helped t o  provide t h e  
background against  which we wore ab l e  t o  view the  s p e c i f i c  Andean Pact  
Technology Policy Project .  We a r e  g r a t e f u l  f o r  t h e i r  considerable help. 
I n  writiw t h i s  repor t  we were faced with t h e  choice of preparing a 
br ief  swnmory report  which would have a wide general  readership within t h e  
IDRC and the  Junta of the  Andean Pact ,  o r  preparing a more extended technical  
repor t  of prime i n t e r c a t  t o  t he  science and technology po l icy  groups i n  both 
organisations. We have t r i e d  t o  follow a middle path and recognise t h a t  we 
run the  r i s k  of s a t i s f y i n g  ne i the r  s e t s  of readers. Bowever we thought i t  
d e s i r a h l e b  prepare a f a i r l y  thorough roport  of our  f indings  and then summarise 
t he  main conclusions i n  the  f i n a l  chapter. I n  t h i s  way those who a r e  only 
in te res ted  i n  the gene ra l i t i e s  can confine t h e i r  reading t o  t he  l a a t  pa r t  of 
the  r epo r t ,  and thoso who wish t o  l ea rn  more about sc ience and technology policy 
research i n  the  Andean region can read t he  f u l l  t ex t .  
We agreed a t  tho beginning of the  review t h a t  i t  w a s  t o  be a j o in t  
undertaking. Both t h e  IDRC and t h e  Andean Pact teams would write t h e i r  own 
repor t s  and those would be exchanced. We a l so  agreed t h a t  t he  f i r s t  d r a f t  
of the  repor t s  would remain confident ia l  t o  the  par t ic ipan ts  i n  t he  review i n  
order t o  ensure t h a t  no information considered conf iden t ia l  would be released. 
After t h i s  first exchange and checking, t he  r epo r t s  could be c i rcu la ted  t o  
other  members of the  two organisations.  This paper is the IDRC contr ibut ion 
t o  t h i s  jo in t  review of t he  Phase I1 project .  
A, ' i ' l !~ 1'~3 ' )~02e ?:1j4,1 F:(! lircjil o!' I.; c Rcvi rkr 
( i )  ,Objective:; --- of ti:<? Ii-!vi c s  
Tho ffi:iin purposr; of thc. ~~evicl . :  wils t o  rtsoess t h e  l e s sons  wh ic l~  might tc 
l earned  frori  t h e  experience of' tilc proerar.?lnc of work c a r r i e d  out by the  
Technology Po l i cy  C r o ~ p  of t h o  Andean Pact  over t h e  p a s t  f i v e  y e a r s  wi th  
f i n a n c i a l  s u p p o r t  from t h e  I D R C .  
Tie  Andean P a c t  Pro j c c t  was one of t h e  f irst  s c i e n c e  and technology pol icy  
r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t s  t o  be supported by t h e  Centre. I n  i ts  two phases i t  has  rwl  
f o r  more than  f i v e  y e a r s ,  and the  t o t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  of Centre  funds has been about 
$421,550. December 1976 seemed tin appropr i a t e  t ime t o  t a k e  s tock  of t h e  whole 
p r o j e c t ,  as w e l l  as t o  review more s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h e  work of Phase 11. 
From IDRC p e r s p e c t i v e  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  review were: 
1. To a s s e s s  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  o r i g i n a l  o b j e c t i v e s  of  t h e  
p r o j e c t  were met, and the  e x t e n t  t o  which they were a p p r o p r i a t e ;  
2. To review the  methodology t h a t  was used and a o s e s s  i t s  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  
f o r  o t h e r  p r o j e c t s  i n  o t h e r  coun t r i e s ;  
3. To examine the  n a t u r e  of t h e  ~ ~ ~ ~ / ~ n d e a n  P a c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  and where 
appropr i a t e  t o  draw l e s sons  f o r  f u t u r e  Centre suppor ted  p r o j e c t s .  
We recogn i se  t h a t  t he  Andean P a c t  Technology Po l i cy  Group w i l l  draw i t s  own 
l e s sons  from t h e  review, but  t hese  a r e  n o t  t h e  concern of t h i s  r e p o r t .  
(ii) hlethod of t he  Review 
Th i s  review was c a r r i e d  ou t  i n  a very  d i f f e r e n t  way from the review of 
Phase I. That  review had c o n s i s t e d  of a meet ing he ld  i n  Idma i n  t h e  Autumn of 1972 
a t t ended  by approxilllately t e n  eminent persons a l l  w e l l  experienced i n  sc i ence  and 
technology p o l i c y  r e sea rch .  The p ~ n e l  of e x p e r t s  however had no oppor tun i ty  t o  
c r i t i c a l l y  review t h e  work done i n  Phase I and no r e p o r t  was i s sued .  We judged 
t h i s  approach t o  have been d i sappo in t ing .  I n  p a r t  t h e  f a i l u r e  of t he  group t o  make 
c! c r i t i c a l  review was due t o  t h e  s i z e  and composition of the  group, and i n  p a r t  due 
t o  t h e  t iming of t h e  review. The Andean Pact  team had completed t h e i r  r e sea rch  but  
had n o t  y e t  completed t h e i r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  of  t h e  r eg ion  over t h e  
ensuing p o l i c i e s .  They could n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  r e v e a l  t o  t h e  pane l  t h e  d e t a i l s  
of t h e s e  p o l i c i e s ,  and without  them the  s t u d i e s  were on ly  of l i t t l e  i n t e r e s t ,  and 
t h e i r  re levance  t o  p o l i c y  was not  apparent .  
Drawing on t h i s  exper ience  i t  was decided t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  review o f  Phase I1 
of the  p r o j e c t  by a s m a l l  team made up e n t i r e l y  of IDRC s t a f f .  We hoped t h a t  t h i s  
would a l low more d e t a i l e d  and f r ank  d i scuss ions  t o  take  place. We b e l i e v e  i t  did.  
(iii) The L imi ta t ions  of t h e  Review 
The IDRC team s p e n t  only two days w i t h  t h e  Andean P a c t  Technology Group i n  
Lima. Thus a l though we were a b l e  t o  exp lo re  t h e  l i n k s  between t h e  Centre  suppor t e i  
s t u d i e s  and p o l i c y  a t  t he  r e g i o n a l  l e v e l  we were unable t o  explore  t h e  l i n k s  betwea 
t h e s e  s t u d i e s  and p o l i c y  a t  a n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  i n  t h e  member c o u n t r i e s  of  t h e  Pact .  
Nor could we make any s y s t e m a t i c  assessment  of t h e  impact of the  p o l i c i e s  on deveb l  
ment . 
Although we drew on our  previous  knowledge of t h e  work of t he  team, and 
a l though we b e n e f i t t e d  from t h e  op in ions  of o t h e r s ,  we a r e  only  t o o  well aware of 
t h e  s u p e r f i c i a l  and s u b j e c t i v e  na.ture of  t h e  review. Despi te  t h e s e  l i m i t a t i o n s  we 
s t i l l  th ink  the re  a r e  l e s s o n s  t o  be l ea rned  from even t h i s  r e s t r i c t e d  method of 
review and i n  l a t e r  s e c t i o n s  we w i l l  t r y  t o  make them e x p l i c i t .  
I n  3 968 Cololt~Lia, I<curldor, I'aYu, M l i v i : ~  and Chile sicnod th , :  
Acuerdo dc Cer t a~ . em n:ld thus c s i ! ~ t l i s i ~ e d  thc  Andem Pact. The maill 
t purpose of t h i s  a@@ecn,c.l~t w&s to  e o t n t l i s h  a basis whcruby the  c~ur~tric. : :  
of tho SuL-licgion could move toi::rr.rlo f'orma of economic cooperation and, 
i n  ce r t a in  areas ,  to:rnrds econo!nic i n t c ~ r u t i o n .  Subsequently, venozueia 
joined thc  Pact, but by the  end of 1976 Chilo had withdrawn from almost 
a l l  the consti tuent pa r t s  of the Pact. 
From i t e  very e a r l i e s t  days the  Sec re t a r i a t  of the Andean Pac t  
recognised t h a t  questions about t e chno lo6~  were relevant t o  t h e  advance- 
mont of the Pac t ' s  econozdc and p o l i t i c a l  objectivee.* Wore spec i f i ca l l y ,  
the acceptance by the member countr ies  of Docision 24** highlighted tho 
need t o  develop c l e a r  po l i c i e s  f o r  tecflnoloey a s  a par t  of the emerging 
s t ruc ture  of the Pac t ' s  po l ic ies .  The submission of the  f i r s t  proposal 
t o  the I D R C  i n  1971 followed the acceptance of t h i e  Decision, and the  
proposed work was desimed i n  pa r t  t o  e labora te  i t 8  technological  consequences. 
Both the request  f o r  funds and IDRC1e aseement  t o  provide support 
were predicated on two cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of the Andean Pact  which pu t  the 
project  i n  a d i f f e r en t  category from most ot!ler IDRC eupported projects .  
Since these f ac to r s  condit ion the way i n  which the  r e su l to  of the  work 
should be asseseed, i t  i s  important t o  e t a t e  them exp l i c i t l y :  4 
1. The Junta of the Andean Pact i s  not an academic i n s t i t u t i o n .  
J 
Its job is t o  prepare the d r a f t s  of po l i c i e s  and decision8 which 
a r e  then negotiated by the countries. Hesearch is only ca r r i ed  
out  t o  the extent  t h a t  i t  is needed f o r  policy formulation. 
Therefore the request  f o r  IDRC funds was f o r  a j o i n t  e t ~ d ~ / ~ o l i c ~  
formulation process, with no brendkokn between the  time t o  be 
spent on each of these a c t i v i t i e s .  This i s  a very important aspect  
which has implications f o r  tile nature of the research carr ied out 
and f o r  how one assesses  its 'qual i ty1.  Thie iesue w i l l  be discussed 
fu r the r  i n  the assessment section,  
2. Tho concern of the Andoan Pact Sec re t a r i a t  waa with ecience and 
technology which is s o c i a l l y  and economically important. I n  other 
. words, science and t e c h n o l o a  a r e  seen a s  tools  t o  achieve other 
, objec tivee. These object ives  a r e  p o l i t i c a l  a s  well  a s  s o c i a l  and 
economic. Furthermore t he  concern of the technology pol icy team 
of the Andean Pact was t o  develop po l i c i e s  which would r e s u l t  i n  
quick re turns  on technologiccll investments. It was recognised t h a t  
unless f a i r l y  quick r e tu rns  on investment could be guaranteed, the  
po l i t i c i ans  would have li t t l e  i n t e r e s t  i n  investing i n  technology. 
It was t h i s  emphasis on quick re turns  which makes the  pro jec t  
d i f fe ren t  from niost of the  other  sc ience and technology policy pro jec t s  
supported by the Centre, 
3 
I n  t h i e ,  ttle Andean Pact  was, and t o  a l a rge  extent  still  i e ,  unique 
among regional  economic groupings i n  the  developing world i n  seeing 
t h a t  policy about technology nrust be an  i n t eg ra l  pe r t  of a coherent 
po r t fo l i o  of development pol icy measures. 
** Decision 24 of the Commission of the Andean Pact was concerned wi th  the 
common treatment mong the  111ember countr ies  of f o r e i m  d i r ec t  invest- 
ments, trademarks, pa ten ts ,  l icensing agreements and roya l t i e s .  A s  with 
the  general c o ~ ~ c e r n  about technology, t h i s  spec i f i c  decis ion owed much 
t o  the r e s u l t s  of e a r l i e r  d i n ~ n o s t i c  research carr ied out mainly outs ide  
the f o m a l  machinery of the  Pact. 
A J ~ O ~ . ! , ~ : L ~  ve!v:; ~ ! ~ : ~ C I . L : A I I ~  cI!.u!-;~! .iu t . 1 ; ~  cor~~(:xt, of t): t2 IJO,.;: ,r 
roviow lilrvljld LC ~ ~ n t . i d  I I C ~ C .  J ~ l r ~ ~ i n d  t i l ~  1J.i'ctiu of t ire Pact 
f ,avo t,se~i l'undae,..;n la l  cir:rjl,cs i l l  tilt: gu\rt+l.nt:i2nts of ul:rny of u1 c h  
cct~ult.rie:;. These c l r i : : 1 ~ ~ 3  kiuvc: resul ted j.n idoologictil nh i f t s  ut,u 
p n c r u l  policy ch:t:l:;~:s of thc nu tioncrl. ~ovcrluncnts with conuequonti..tl 
cljangco i n  a t  t i tuc l .~  tc;r~cds the collcey t and yonoib i l i t i es  of econouic 
cooperation und intot;ration, hs well  ~13 to~vards the means by which 
econonlic dcvclopmejl t i s  t o  .bz yuraued. 
differelrcoo, higlllig11l;ed by the w i  thdrowal of Chile from 
the Pact, genercrtcd a c r i s i s  within the Pact. This hoa impliccrtions 
both f o r  the  work procrcnnrna of the Technology Policy Group of the 
Sec re t a r i a t  and f o r  tho nature  of aoeessments we con mke. We s h a l l  
r e tu rn  t o  sorue of t h e w  implications i n  l a t e r  sect ions  of the  report;. 
C, An Outline of 1;11(? Phase I Project.* 
This review is primarily concerned with t h e  reeu l ta  of the  Phase I1 
project. Uowover i n  order t o  seo t h i s  i n  i ts  proper perspective i t  is 
necessary t o  have eome understanding of what happened i n  Phaoe I. 
The Phase I pro jec t  mainly consisted of s tudiee and research which 
led t o  the formula t ion  of technology po l i c i e s  needed t o  noperationalise" 
Decieion 24. These po l ic ies  wero deaiened t o  guide the  ways i n  which 
fore icn  tochnolou waR t o  be acquired and t o  encourage the development 
of,  loca l  technology. The s tud ies  drew heavily on e a r l i e r  technology 
policy research which had been carried out i n  the region. This e a r l i e r  
work was e s s e n t i a l l y  diagnost ic  but i t  provided answers t o  euch quest ions  
as:- How was technology acquired from foreign sources? What were the 
costs  and other consequences? Bow wel l  did loca l  technological 
i n s  ti t u  t ions  supply needed technology? What were t h e i r  l imi ta t ions  and 
why d id  these a r i s e ?  
The phase I project  extended t h i s  work and went on t o  explore 
some problems a t  a new leve l  of de ta i l .  For example, s tud ie s  were made 
of the 'packaging' and disaggregation of supplied technology, and of 
engineering services.** 
* The IDRC support ($146,500) f o r  t h i s  e iehteen ( l a t e r  twenty-one) 
month pro jec t  was complemented by funds from the Organisation of 
American States .  
** I n  t h i s  respect the project  marked a new i n i t i a t i v e  i n  technology 
policy s tud ies ,  There had been previous examinations of the 
production of technical  knowledge by R & D, and some s tud ies  had 
been made i n  the region concerning the use of technology i n  production 
operations. Almost nothing was known about the c r i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  
lying i n  between production and f i n a l  use - the various engineering 
and consult ing a c t i v i t i e s  which l i nk  the two together. 
V i r i i t : ;  ni:rc ~ i ! i . l d ~  ?it II I I I IL : I~~- : !~  0:' 0t1li.r C O I U I ~ I : ~ C S ,  IIIU.;I, 01' t.l,;.c, 
mo1.c. dt.vclollcd tllnll t!i.-. AII~I~::IU F t c t  coiu~tr.ico, to nrrsc.38 Ulc w:,J. ;  i l l  
~ l l i  cI\ tliu i:~\ri ' l '~~;iellf.~ 1 I:L?SC ~ ~ l l l l ~ l ' i  r;9 ( 1 1 )  ref l la ted tht: I.lb:. 
of f a r e j . ~ , ~  tec!;liolo;;y (t) cstnlli .nhcd ljrocodures f o r  unpackaging 
technolocy and ( c) hc3.1,t:3 t o  build up l o c a l  technologicnl capabi l i t ic: ; .  
Tlle main purpose of t h i s  conrponont lros t o  a s s i s t  i n  t h e  formulation of 
the  po l ic ies  ubout these isoucr, wllich tillould be followed i n  t he  Andean 
Pact rebion. 
The r e s u l t s  of t h i s  research* were then drawn on t o  develop t he  
basis  f o r  thc Andean Pact  o t r a t e w  on technolorn and develo ment. This 
s t r a t e e y  a s  a whole was incorporated i n t o  a posi t ion paper t' l a t e r  a 
White paper), on Technology Policy which was vdopted by t he  member 
countries.  Spec i f ic  elements of t h i s  s t r a t e m  were elaborated i n t o  a 
nuurber of l e g i s l a t i v e  docvuento which were presented to ,  of ten  modified 
following discuss ions  i n ,  and f i n a l l y  approved by, the Commission of t h e  
Pact  .** These l e a s l a  t i v e  measures included: 
- Decision 84: t he  bas i s  f o r  subregional  technology policy;  
- Decision 85: r e e u l a t i o ~  f o r  the app l ica t ion  of ru lee  
concerniw i n d u s t r i a l  property; 
- Decisions 86 and 87: Andean p ro j ec t s  on technological 
development concerning the  hydrometallurgy of copper. 
- Decision 89 : Andean pro j oc t s  on technological  development 
f o r  the use of t r op i ca l  f o r e s t  resources. 
Severa l  of these Decisions a r e  now being implemented by spec i f i c  
Technology Development Proe;rammes, ca l l ed  PADTIs of t en  with f i n a n c i a l  
ass i s tance  from other donors. These have included AF'N Division of t he  
IDRf: which provided approximately $1 mi l l ion  f o r  the  technological  research 
cal led f o r  i n  Decision 89 concerned with t r o p i c a l  f o r e s t  cu l t iva t ion .  
German technical  ass i s tance  has been used t o  complement Decisions 86 and 87 
on the hydrometallurgy of copper, 
* Summaries of most of the  research undertaken i n  Phase I have been 
published by the  IDRC i n  *'Technology Pol icy and Economic Development1* 
IDRC 0618 (1976). 
The t e x t  of the  White Paper on Technology Policy, and of pa r t s  of 
Decisions 24, 84 and 85 have been published by IDRC a s  IDRC 0608 . 
(1976) 
CIIhFfJ'ER 11 PI!E..JE 1 J I'ROJEC'I': -- E. I'AC'I\UAIA OUT1,JIZ 
A. Thc Orl r:inol Propo.?nl 
I n  t h i s  ~ e c t j  011 of' the  repor t  we propose t o  present n f a i r l y  f u l l  
summary of t!to work tha t  lxrd bcun dons i n  Phase I1 up u n t i l  t h e  time of 
our review. This chapter w i l l  l o  of i n t c r e s  t primarily t o  those reader8 
who wish t o  know the  d e t a i l s  of the  s c i e~ lce  and techno lo^ policy research 
carr ied out. Readers wllose main i n t e r e s t  i s  i n  the assessment of p ro jec t  
may wish t o  proceed d i r e c t l y  t o  tho next chapter. 
Phase I1 was a log ica l  e x t c ~ ~ s i o n  of Phase I. However, i t  was very 
d i f f e r en t  from Phase I, and over time t h i s  difference became sharpened. 
I n  Phase I the research work was designed primarily t o  provide the bas i s  
f o r  formulating : e n e r a 1  pol ic ies ,  f o r  drawing up overal l  ~ u i d e l i n e s  and 
s t r a t e a e s ,  and f o r  d ra f t i ng  l eg i s l a t i on  which s e t  the broad context f o r  
technoloeical  a c t i v i t i c o  within t h e  region. For Phase I1 the  proposed 
l i nes  of research work were la rge ly  geared t o  the development of plane 
f o r  spec i f i c ,  operational projects  and programmes. 
The d i s t i nc t ion  between the  phases was not  clear-cut. The o r ig ina l  
PADTBs which were planned during Phase I have been implemented i n  p a r a l l e l  
with tho conduct of Phase 11. A t  the same time, the proposal f o r  Phase I1 
contained elements of work (e.g. iterne 4 and 5 below) which were similar 
t o  the  diagnostic,  policy-relevant research which had been important i n  
the Phase I a c t i v i t i e s .  However, the balance between these two types of 
work sh i f t ed  subs tan t ia l ly  between the  two phases. 
The Phase 11 proposal t o  I D R C  outlined f i v e  s u b p r o j e c t s a  These were:- 
1. The in te rnot iona l  search f o r  knowledge and the  disaggregation 
of the know-how components required i n  spec i f i c  pmduction 
a c t i v i t i e s .  
2. The ana lys i s  and planning f o r  new PADT1e. 
3. The development of plans f o r  an information system concerned 
with the acquis i t ion  of foreign technology. 
. 4. Studies of small and medium scale  industry. 
5. Studies on the choice and se l ec t ion  of techniques. 
It was o r ig ina l ly  intended tha t  work would begin i n  June 1973 but 
a f t e r  completion of Phase I the  s t a f f  of the technology policy group was 
reduced i n  s i z e  and the people l e f t  were engaged primarily i n  negot ia t ing  
the agreed contents of the  White Paper and Decisions 84 and 85. A s  a 
r e s u l t ,  work did not  begin u n t i l  January 1974. When the  work began, a 
a t a r t  was made on a l l  f i v e  sub-projects, but i t  was subsequently recognised 
tha t  the s tudies  on small  and medium sized industry  and those on choice 
and se l ec t ion  of techniques, were not going t o  produce immediately applicable 
resu l t s .  I n  addi t ion,  spec i f i c  questions about a l te rna t ive  techniques and 
about emall-scale en te rpr i ses  would of ten be dea l t  with as  pa r t  of the  
par t icu la r  PADT and 'Disaggregation1 work. The Junta therefore proposed 
t h a t  work on these two sub-projects be stopped and the  IDRC funds be 
Imi.:,llo<:at;i:d to  stl.c~~,rl,lien t11~t cbutlies t : l~ iu ! l  were fell :  t o  have 1!j!lilr:y 
p r i o r i l ; ~ .  Thic; C I I L L ~ ~ ~ ; ~ ?  W ~ I U  9 ~ J P I ' O V C ' ~  by the I D R C  . 
1'i1~ y r i n c i p ~ l .  ~oi..l< unde~tciken i n  Phosc I1 IIUS theref ore been 
f o o ~ s s s d  on only thrce of the  o r i c ina l  f i v e  sub-projects. 
( i )  D i s a r : ~ ~ ~ i t i o n  Studies  
The ra t iona le  f o r  work on techno10,nicol disage;regation atems from 
the observed f & c t  t h a t  moot of the technology imported i n t o  the  r e d o n  
comes i n  o packaged form.* It was mcognised t ha t ,  whereas the core, 
or  medullar, techriology may ofton be unique and only obtainable from a 
' 
few sources, the periyherol  technologies could be a c q u i q d  from a 
mul t ip l ic i ty  of sources. Furthermore, t he re  are peripheral  technologies 
which a r e  f requent ly  common to severa l  processes and once acquired by a 
country could be used f o r  multiple purposeo. The Andean Pact Technology 
Team argued t h a t  i f  the packa* could be disaggregated i n t o  core and 
peripheral  technologies, then i t  may be possible t o  obtain  a b e t t e r  dea l  
with tlle tochnolow suppl ie rs  by bargaining f o r  the technologies separate ly .  
It may even be possible  t o  supply some of the  technological elements from 
loca l  sources and i n  any event tho learning e f f e c t  of re-packaging would, 
i n  most instances,  out-weigh the d i s a d v a n t a s  of not a c q u i r i w  the  whole 
package from one suppl ier .  
The team which advmced t h i s  disaggregation hypothesis was influenced 
by the s tud ies  they had ca r r i ed  out during Phase I i n  Japan where t h e  
dioaggregcition approach had been used t o  good e f f e c t  by Japanese business 
and government. 
For o vdioaggregatedt approach t o  be taken t o  the acquis i t ion  of 
i ndus t r i a l  technology i t  i s  c l ea r ly  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  those who make the  
loca l  decisions and who carry  out; bargaining f o r  technology-acquisit ion 
have appropriate information about the a1 te rna t ives  tha t  a r e  ava i lab le  . 
The diagnostic research of Phase I had been followed by work t o  develop 
a method f o r  e f f ec t i ng  dissggrogation,  Thia included a number of spec i f i c  
case s tudies ,  However, the  main objective of tkie work i n  Phase I1 was 
actual ly  t o  produce the inf'ormation about a l t e rna t ive s ,  and following 
its analysis  : ( a )  formulate s p e c i f i c  s e c t o r a l  plans f o r  technology 
acquisi t ion,  and (b)  meet the  needs of individual  loca l  decision-makers, 
The research and ana lys i s  wi thin  t h i s  sub-project  focussed on two 
sources of technology: foreign sources (hence the  concern with  developing 
s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  in te rna t ionvl  setirch) and local ,  intra-regional sources. 
The balance between these two seems t o  vary between sectors ,  For example, 
i n  a study concerned with steel-making technology,** the dominant emphasis 
has s o  f a r  been on overseas sources. On the other  hand, i n  a study f o r  
petrocheuicals indus t ry  a very heavy emphasis was put on loca l  sources, 
For a more ex te ra ive  discussion of t h i s  i s sue  see  Chapter V I  ( " ~ r e a k i n g  
up the  Technology ~ackago")  of Junta  d e l  Acuerdo de Cartagena, Technology 
Pol i  cy and Economic Development , IDRC , 1976. 
*+ For a summary of t h e  background t o  this work see  Chapter VIII  he 
Interna t iona l  Search f o r  Technology: The I ron  and S tee l  ~ n d u s t r y )  
i n  Technology Policy and Economic Development. . 
It, 
- 
' I  : :  - I *  I I I : ;  ' 1  i n  i I j t o  t;lai,l.cJr t uLc 
intei;r:ttt:J, indur.tri t1 j  ti^ ~ c t a a n t  ~ ~ O [ ~ . L L E I I I I C ~  soirg: frlrutnud Ly ti1(: prtc t - u, 
tlrc plurv~cd ::~3'iutJ or NI~J jor illvc.3 t l l r M l l t  ' i n  tiw ~~t rochorn ion l s  Sector.* T)yic 
was, and i n  y~lnc i l r lo  iu.:nnins, :m jnj~ot~tant; merit of tliosc studios - they 
werc not concluctod i r l  a V~ICUUID. I ~ M o v c ' ~ ,  (;I10 chaneed po l i t i ca l  and oconomic 
policy c1il:iotcn i n  the camber countrioo  ha^ moulted i n  8 rlowing down of oms 
of tho induot r ia l  inverrtrrcnt pro~~iwtjmos. Substantial  funds remain tho 
bud& fo r  t t i o  rruh-project, and IJr. Soto plans t o  reac t iva te  t h i s  a rea  of 
work dcriny: an extenoion of tho project - perhaps elabomtin& on tho work done 
in the u teo l  sec tor ,  and oponing up work on pl~arnracouticalr and coal production. 
The output of t h i s  typo of mooarch and analysis can be i l lurrtroted 
by the  case of the Petrochomiculs mtudy. The research 'product1 $XI this 
a s e  consis ts  esaonticrlly of thruo in t e r re l a t ed  reports: 
- A very detai led breakdown of a ranp of d i f fe rent  m e  of 
pe trochomicol plant, 3 ndicating &sic specif icat ions of each 
of the  many componenta, and defining the  types of know-how 
needed. 
A register of (primarily loca l )  enflneers and consultants 
with t h e i r  c a p a b i l i t i e ~  f o r  a p p l y i n g  know-hou and services 
r e l a t ed  t o  the plant  elements specif ied i n  de ta i l .  - A n tg i s t e r  of the capacity of loca l  plant and oompomnt 
suppl iers  with respect t o  elements of petrochemicala plants. 
This spec i f ies  the i r  equipment, experience, q u a l i t y  
capabi l i t ies ,  *to. 
This information provides the basis  f o r  a var iety of planned s t r a t e g i e s  
of technological development f o r  servicing tho growth of the petrochemical 
sector. Alternatively, or  i n  addition, i t  provides the bas is  'for a service 
d i r ec t ly  i n  support of 'unplanned', individual technological decision-making, . 
It is not yet c lear  quite how the r e su l t s  of these s tudies  w i l l i n . f a c t  
be linked through t o  a s o i s t  policy and decis ionaaking st the subreg iona l ,  
national and/or en terpr i se  level.  However, i t  did seem c lea r  t o  ua t ha t  the . 
developmental impact of these ' disaggregation and search' 8 tudie a could be 
very substantial .  Very amall, marginal s h i f t s  between foreign and loca l  
technology supply, and/or very small marginal reductions (by 'bet ter  
bargaining') i n  the unit coats of elements rupplied, could, when applied 
t o  the very large investment sums involved, gonerate developmental benefi ts  
t ha t  would be many multiples of the sums invested in the i n i t i a l  policy 
research. 
* We were to ld  tha t  planned expansion of this sector  within the s u b  
region over the  next three t o  ea r s  w a s  thought l i k e l y  t o  
involve a t o t a l  investment bi l l ion.  Of t h i s  about $600 
mill ion w i l l  be paid f o r  technical knowledge (l icenses,  comulting, 
engineering designs, know-how, etc.)  exc ludiw plant  and equipment. 
-lo- 
> r  'iai.~f~no1o :,: J ' i~licy C'rouyi plan t u  t;yntfiesi.ric i l b  one ~cl,c,r.t tk.(! 
otrrl icr work on Ji:l:-rio;jtic, c:~su-ctudic's a id  on the @ n e r d  mc?tticd for 
d i sucp0o,~a  t ion I A I I ~  S C U ~ C ~ : .  1'hj.s ohould 'n!~ks the expcricnce avai Iuble 
f o r  rr wi dexB i t ~ t k r r l : l  t i o ~ u l  H I I ~ ~ C : I C ~ .  I n  uddi t ion,  this synthesis ,  plug 
the ~ t ! ~ ~ c r r i l  expc.ric.~~cc of the Croup, plus any achicvemonts i n  the d i r s c t  
linkage t o  policy, decision-rakir!  and a c t i o n  w i l l  be w e d  t o  t r y  t o  
a e f f e c t  a e n e r o l  chnnge i n  the 'clitnsto of opinion' i n  the sub-region. about tho ocquieit ion of technoloey, Tho hope i a  that t h i a  w i l l  encourage 
individual entropreneura to  take their oun i n i t i a t i v e s  i n  thi. area,  and 
t h a t  i t  w i l l  b r i n ~  locolieed prcoouro to  bear on nat ional  governments t o  
adopt yo l ic iee  a t  l e a s t  consis tent  with t h i s  approach t o  technology 
acquioit ion,  and preferably i n  d i r e c t  nupport of such r n  approach, We 
were not ablo t o  aooeoa tho l i k e l y  e f f e c t  on this i n d i r e c t  l i n k  between 
research output and pol ic ies ,  dociaions and actiorrs, 
(ii ) Andean Pact Promenmes of Technolosical Development (PADT* s )  
The Andean Pact  team recognlaed t h a t  a pol icy t o  optimise t h e  b e  
of foreign technology needed t o  be oomplomented by a policy which would 
stimula to  loca l  technical capab i l i t i e s  and which would eventually lead 
t o  the loca l  generation of technolwy, The r a y  i n  which the  latter funct ion 
hsa been approached has been th rowh  the PADT1e - e p o i f i c  i n d u s t r i a l  
prograsnea of technological development,. This approclch aa formally approved 
i n  pr inciple  i n  Decision 84, and s o  far s p e c i f i c  programmes have been 
doaignod f o r  copper procesaihg, t rop ica l  f o r e s t  produc ta, food processing 
indus t r ies  and protein-enriched foods, 
Each of the proeramncs involved an agreed plan of work necessi t a t i n g  
cooperation between s p e c i f i c  i r s t i t u t e a  i n  tha p a r t i c i p a t i n g  countr ies ,  
blot a l l  countries of the region pa r t i c ipa t e  i n  a l l  PADTe, For example, 
there  were three countriea pa r t i c ipa t ing  i n  the copper o r e  procesaing 
progroorme, and f ive i n  the  t rop icc l  fores  t products programme. Coopera t i on  
i n  the iaplecentat ion of each of .tire PADTa goes far beyond cooperation i n  
technical  rosearch and developnent. It includes cooperation i n  support 
services ,  t ra ining,  the acquis i t ion  of foreign technology, and informa t i o n  
netvorko. A com.it tes i s  establ ished f o r  each of the aec tora l  programes 
and t h i s  d r a m  up a schedule of tasks, s e t s  deadlines and a l loca te s  resources, 
. The copper and fo res t ry  PADTs were designed i n  Phase I. Their 
implementation has gone on concurrently with the  i n i t i a t i o n  of other  
propaumes in .Phase 11, but t he  financing of the implementation phase has 
come from other  aources ( including I D R C 1 s  Agricultrrre, Food and Nutr i t ion ~ i v i s i o n ) ,  
A s  pa r t  of the Phase I1 pro jec t ,  the p o u p  is  m y i n g  ou t  the  research 
and analysis  needed t o  draw upplans f o r  PADTs i n  two new areas, One, food 
procestr5.-;: i r r  a l ready compltte. Thc other i s  in'the area of coal  technology and 
work waR duo t o  begin on t h i s  tn Ma:-cll 1577; and is due..to be completed '. - 
by February 1978. The group is considering the 
, 
j>o.:::.i I ,  i li 1.y o i  dc-v::!.ol.j.t:,; 1',\1)'~'':; i n  on2 or two o t ln r  arcus. 1l11~ 
f i n a l  cui.j,ut: of tit ;:, i;ltci:lPtl t~ rl rcucurch/;~n:ll~ois/~l'~m~in~- work is a 
detailcrl plun f o r  ti12 rc .~lui~*id t c -c~molo~ica l  c t iv i  tie8 ,+ 
A l n r ~ s  auount of tinis 53 irpznt i n  widespread discussions t o  build 
up thc n2ceosat.y il!s'iitution:il s t r u c t i ~ m  f o r  implementation, to oreanise 
tho rospcctive inst i tut ionci l  roles  within the PADT, and to r e t  up the  
various yrinciplcs and mochanisrs of cooperation. Only when . this  i a  al l  
clear  and agreed is tho f i n a l  p l a ~ i n g  document; f o r  the POT drawn up 
for  presentation to the Cormci~sion, 
Different sec tors  have very d i f ferent  character ir t icn no that  the 
PDT's have t o  be taIlo~-nladc f o r  each sector.  For example the copper 
ore processin3 indmtr iea  a ro  very d i f fe ren t  ntructural ly from the 
t ropical  fo rea t  product industrios,  The respective PADT'r coneequently 
have d i f ferent  character is t ics .  For example, i n  the copper PUT f i n a l  
application of thc resu l t s  of the technoloeical development prwrannne 
w i l l  depend on a few large enterprises  - of ten n ta tc  controlled and/or 
linked to large ru l t ina t iona l  enterprises.  I n  the fores t ry  PADT f i n a l  
economic application depends on a host of very nmall, ncattered, l o c a l  
entcrprices,  I n  fac t ,  these two sectors  were chosen a r  t e s t  caseat. 
The belief,  was that  if the  PADT concept could be made t o  work with 
s igni f icant  r e s u l t s  i n  these two very d i f fe ren t  sectors,  then i t  corlld 
probably be made to  work across a very wide range of production sectors  
i n  the economies of the sub-region, 
The main ' output' o r  ' r e su l t '  of t h i s  PADT component of the Phase ZI 
project w i l l  be the  implementation of two or more packages of planned 
technological development a c t i v i t i e s .  The speed with which the copper and 
forostry PADTs moved from plnn t o  practice suggests that the implementation 
phase of any new PADT w i l l  follow quite  rapidly behind the work iq the 
Phase I1 project.  
Because of the nature of the re searcb /a~ ly s i s /~ lann in~  work ly ing  
behind the f i m l  PADT plan docm.ent, there w i l l  not be much by way of 
'research output' as 1 t is cocventionally understood, Occasionally, 
intermediate research-based papers and reports a r e  published, but the 
a c t i v i t i y  as  a whole i s  far-rezoved from 'academic research' and i ts  out- 
put is correspondingly different .  I n  any case, the main value of this 
work t o  a wider audience is the methodology involved, and the group propose 
t o  produce a  short publication of the methodology as an introduction t o  the 
s e r i e s  of PADT planning reports which w i l l  cons t i tu te  the ' publications 
output' of the work. 
* We were provided w i t h  a copy of this plan document f o r  the PADT i n  
the hydrometallurgy of copper. This is  a document of 175 pages 
covering a diasnos t i c  review of the problem area  and the iden t i f  i ca t ion  
. of technological solutions, a review of the technological s t a t e  of the 
a r t  relevant  t o  the  proposed l i n e s  of development, and detai led plans 
(timing, personnel, t raining,  ins t i tu t ions ,  budgets, e t f o r t h e  
various a c t i v i t i e s  needed, 
Thc ll!.!~'l' :q ~ ' v o ' L ~ * ) I  ?.I)  ~ ~ ~ I I I I Y I  ~ I I : ?  f n r  ccioy.lc:r:~l.i *?, r.:tct,,~.-c'~,,.,..:.., . : / A  
t.~cl!~?itlo.:i.l:::.L ~:U~J~:~L~I;: : . . !II~.  xurk .:t;*:::?:d t o  w to I,(! exc~jllt..r~t. (1:~ t;. . 
o w  j:atr~i, LII:;~!:~;~S 01' ti;*: : ;oci~tl ,  ~t!i.f~oo;ic u l d  polit.icb1 i ~ u ~ , l i ~ j ~ i ~ , ~ ~ ~  
of tcchuical ci;:::;:c a :i ~ J L ;  char t  i t  bi . lon~3 - i n  trdvhncc of,  and hot 
of tcr, the  S i ~ i  t u t ion  of vl'i'or i s  to cfl 'ect  technicrrl chanp .  I n  
oddi  t ion,  tikc cal'af~tll:; pLnned ~ppronch m e m  f a r  more l i k e l y  t o  
ac tua l ly  l e d  t o  innovation and teclltiical churree, and t o  the  dcvelor~lent  
of appropriate l oca l  s k i l l s ,  then many e a r l i e r  end provoiling approaches 
t o  t i u s e  objectives which otphasise R & D planning t o  tho  exclusion of 
almost everything e l se .  Pj .mlly,  we would p e s s  t h a t  t he  time consumed 
Sn the  detai led resoarch, m o l y s i s  and planning of the PIST8 w i l l  be more 
thkn adequately compensated by the speed with which developmental r e s u l t s  
w i l l  follow, 
We r c e r o t  t ha t  we d id  no t  hove time t o  r tudy  i n  d e t a i l  the operations 
and probable developmental consequences of any one of t h e  PADTa. However, 
ue believe tha t  if they can be ouccessfully implemented, the benef i t s  
t o  a l l  the pa r t i c ipa t ing  countr ies  would be r o  evident t h a t  r c i e n t i f i c  
and technologi c a l  coopera t i on  between the  countries of the re& on could 
wall endure even noro d r a s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  c r i s e s  within the Andean Pact 
than has been the case i n  the l a s t  few months. 
( i i i )  v a n s  f o r  a Technical Information System 
The acquisi  t ion  of information and i t a  intra-regional exchange were 
ecen, from a vory e a r l y  date,  as c r i t i c a l  requirements f o r  (a)  the  
&mplementation of s ec t ions  of Decision 24, (b) the operation of Pact  
i n i t i a t i v e s  i n  the a r e s  of PADTs and the  diaageregated acquis i t ion  of 
t echno loa ,  a d  ( c )  the conduct of e i ~ i l a r  a c t i v i t i e s  within the region 
but independently of the par t icu lar  programmes i n 1  t i a t e d  by the Pact,  
The Andean Pact team recomised t h a t  tho region had need f o r  two types 
of information about techrrology, The f i r s t  of these was information 
about techno10,ricel agreements which hod been negotiated with d i f f e r e n t  
foreign firma i n  the rogion, The second was a need f o r  s p e c i f i c  
technological information which would be usefu l  both i n  the bargaining 
process and i n  tho deve loy~en t  of  l oca l  technological capabi l i t i es .  
With respect  t o  the  f i r s t  need, the  o r ig ina l  objective had been t o  
compile a v e r j  de ta i led  data  base about a l l  agreements and cont rac ts  
with foreign firms, I n  a f i r e t  phase, bas ic  da ta  about foreign inves tors  
a d  tachnology would be compiled, I n  a second phaee much more de t a i l ed  
information abnut t h e i r  technolcyical behavi our and economic performance 
would be added. This system would serve two purposes. On the one hand 
the oystem would cons t i tu te  a kind of permanent, on-going research pro jec t  
t o  keep policy-making constant ly  informed about t h i s  a rea  of concern, 
On the  o ther  hand, i t  would be used t o  support  bargaining and decision- 
making i n  individual  cases of investment or  technology acquis i t ion ,  
During the  l a t t e r  par t  of Phase I and the  e a r l y  pa r t  of Phase 11, 
plans were d r a m  up f o r  a system of this type. The group now r e a l i r e  
tha t ,  even within the  i n i t i a l  p o l i t i c a l  climate of the Pact, t h i s  was . 
probably over-ambi t ious,  There was l i k e l y  t o  be considerable r e s i a  tance . 
L U  ~ i , r :  ri!.l ( I ~ L ; L '  of thr? 5 ni'(u.:ii:~ ti011 c:do:l -by oatc~yr*iooo and ria tion:tl 
~ ~ \ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ l t i i ~ l i t ~ ,  atit1 LO if.:.. ct i~: ;~?i la i ; i~; i  r r i  t!tin ir cbii t r h l i ~ e d  system. Tile 
chonsin~: yo1.i i j  cal ciia::~ t:: ha.; cer  la inly r ~ ~ ~ c r a v n t o d  theso inllex*ent. , 
p r o l l o t ; ~ ~ ,  lkf orc t!~e j1li:lu cou1.d t,o put t o  the Commi~sion as the  'basis 
f o r  a f o r m 1  Decision, tho p o l i t i c t ~ l  ~ l i m g c s  nj.tlrin the member countricv 
led  t o  o major debate within the Pact about D ~ c i s i o n  24. Since the  
informution system was, i n   lor^^ scaaure t o  help i n  the negot ia t ions 
on foreign a.nvootrr.r.nt whj.ch we3 crt the hoart  of Docision 24, A t  aeemed 
an  inappropriate time t o  propose t h i s  new in fomat ion  acheme. However, 
informal Icoves have been made t o  c l m e  the gap between plana and pract ice .  
Nodifications w i l l  have to be made t o  the or ig ina l  proposal, and the 
resoarch-based plans need t o  be 'tran31ated8 i n t o  a logal  document. 
When t h i s  has been dons, i t  w i l l  be s u t n i t t e d  t o  the  Commission f o r  formal 
approval - probably t o s t h e r  with the plans f o r  dealiqg with the  second. 
type of i n f o r m t i o n  used. 
The plans f o r  d e a l i w  with the tochnical information needs were 
r e l a t ive ly  simple. This s impl i c i ty  stemmed i n  l a rge  part from the 
observation (mainly p r io r  t o ,  and durirq,  Phase I) of the way technica l  
information-users functioned - both within the region and i n  more 
indus t r i a l i s ed  countries.  It became c l ea r  t h a t  such users d i d  not  
require  d i r e c t  access t o  masses of technical i n f  o m  t ion  p e r  se.  
Vhat needed was a system which could l i n k  w e n ,  o f t en  with 
r r t h e r  vaguely specif ied needs, t o  the m u l t i p l i c i t y  of e x i s t i n g  acess  
points i n t o  tho world's s tock of tochnical knowledge and information. 
I n  addition, s ince  the need was very often not f o r  infornat ion per s e  
but for  tho knowledge and se rv ices  of people with information and know- 
how, a system which was linkod t o  access  points  o r  t o  sources (people 
and i n s t i t u t i o n s )  was l i k e l y  t o  be more usefu l  than one which uas  linked 
t o  disehbodied information, Moreover, the system i t s e l f  would be simpler 
and cheaper. 
Having developed t h i s  approach t o  m e t i n g  technical  information 
nesds i n  the sub-region, the eroup developed more concrete plans f o r  en 
opeinntional systec.  Once acain,  i n i t i a l ,  in forna l  8 tops have been taken 
t o  movo from plan t o  practice.  Houever, although this component of the 
work on in fomat ion  systems is less closely t ied than the  other  t o  t h e  
contentious problem a reas  surrounding Decision 24, progress has been 
blocked. Future plans f o r  the work of the group w i l l  almost ce r t a in ly  
incorporate a c t i v i t i e s  t o  move t h i s  a r ea  of work towards implementation. 
rsD 
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Tho first sections of t h i s  report have provided a f a i r l y  factual  S E w r y  
of what has I~nyycned i n  tho oourse of tho Andean P&C~/IDRC collaboration on 
tec!molocy policy studicn. The next rroctione coutcrin a more rub3ective 
aeseosmont of sone aspects of t h i s  pa*omamms -wi th  pnrtioular reference t o  
p b e e  XI. Tho ea r l i e r  remarks i n  Section I about the l imitat ion of our om 
rexiow exercise ohould be borne i n  mind throughout. - 
A. Objoctivea of the Project 
The question we address i e  whether, i n  hindsight, the  or ig inal  obdectives 
and my subsequent changes i n  these were appropriate, and roa l i s t i o  obJectives. 
Appropriotenees i n  t h i s  context i s  assessed part icularly w i t h  reference t o  
IDRC a 
The overriding obdective of the whole prodect war t o  prepare policy 
proposals. Research was not t o  be carried out ae an and i n  i t s e l f ,  but only 
as an .id t o  policy formulation. Thus reeearch and analymis were t o  ba par t  
of an integrated projeot u @ t  up t o  produce plans and, although 'research 
reports '  might well be produced en-route, the destination war the submimion 
A 
of operational, plan documents t o  the Comdasion. 4 
A prodect with t h i s  t y g  of objective is  re la t ively  unuak1 among the 4 
policy-related research supported by the Centre. However, i t  seems wholly 
appropriate that  the portfol io of prodects supported by the Centre rhould 
incorporate some projects of t h i s  type. 
This  overall  objective of producing research-based plans was qualified. 
The plans had t o  re la te  clooely t o  other developments and policy i n i t i a t i v e s  
under consideration by the b1bmber Sta tes  of the Pact. This approach of 
s e t t i ne  the technoloey policy work within the context of related policy 
developents ( fo r  example, i n  t h i s  case, Decision 24, or  the indus t r i a l  
inteeration proposals) seeme t o  us t o  be preferable t o  t rea t ing technology 
policy questions i n  isolation.+ ' 
. f 
1 
Another qualif icat ion t o  the basic objective of the project was that dl 
the planning ac t i v i t i e s  should re la te  to  operational programmes with re la t ive ly  
short-term pay-off periods. This objective was reinforced during the courae 
of Phase 11. Main, on its own, t h i s  objective does not r a i s e  any questions 
3n our minds. Rwever, the question of possible confl ict  with other  objectives 
has t o  be considered. -4 
Another large Centre-supported project (STPI) is i n  f a c t  based on the 
assumption tha t  t echo log ica l  development & inextricably in ter re la ted  with 
other d i~ene ions  of the development process, and that one requirement fo r  rj 
technology policy reeearch i l r  t o  understand these Interrelationshipa bet ter .  9 
Co11f 1ic:l. 1:i ;.kt :t r j  ::(i, f o r  cxa!.#plc, .bctk~c!w tliic ob jcrltivc lonecr.- 
tc1.a c,LJ1-.rti.vl:.; ~ . o l a t i l ! ~ ;  t o  L ~ I C  1.i!~c:rl*cIl a c t i v i t y  i t s c l f .  Wo weyo not; 
t o  c:cpl.oi.~ i1;i.s qucstioi? i l l  tiny d c t i r i l ,  but so!ce fc.atureu of the  wo1.k ::,ecu! tc; 
ilidicutc Chn t; ovcriii 1 ru..?t!:lrch S 'ilU~tc:fj ok jcc t ivea  were probably not CGl::pror,i::c.:i , 
For cxan:plc, l n  thc Pj:l~'j: vo1.L. c.irricd out ulongaide Yhclse I ,  the objoctivt: of 
ooekiug riipid py-of'!' di t i  hot prcvcnt the ee lcc t ion  of problem a reas  t h a t  
would ai:nultaneously coc t r i b u t c  t o  a p e a  t c r  understanding of the  broader 
pol icy i ~ s u e o  involved ( tho de l ibe lu t e  se lec t ion  of programmes r e l a t i n g  t o  
soc tors  with cont ras t ing  s t r u c t u r s s  of production en t e rp r i s e ) .  
Did tho weicht of t h i c  object ive  i n  Phase I1 compromise t he  rescarch work 
a t  a more de ta i led  level?  Again, we have l i t t l e  information upon which t o  
base a judeec~ent. Within the  work of the pcrrticular sub-projects,  we bel ieve 
that the  e f f e c t  was s n s l l  but  not  i n s i p i f i c a n t .  For example, t h e  i n i t i a l  
Junta proposal f o r  work i n  the  'disaggregationt sub-project r e f e r r ed  t o  a 
general  'evaluation'  of requirements f o r  learning-by-doing t h a t  would euide t h e  
formulation of policy a t  both geileral rind specif  i c  p ro j ec t  l eve l s .  Although 
t h i s  work wcs described as b c i n ~  "of pa r t i cu l a r  i n t e r e s t t o ,  i t  was not  presented 
during the  revie11 ae a component of t h e  work p180gramme. This apparent s h i f t  
away from diaLnootic types of  research with  general  po l icy  impl icat ions  towards 
more s p e c i f i c  types of planning-oriented ana lys i s  has probably occurred i n  
varying degrees within a l l  the  ac t i ve  sub-grojects. It may have been the  
consequence of a number of fac tors .  Howsver, we bel ieve t h a t  t h e  g r e a t e r  
emphaeis given t o  t he  'shcrt-term pay-offt objective,  which was a consequence 
of chances i n  t he  wider context  of the  group's work, con t r ibu ted  t o  t h i s  
s h i f t i n g  int ra-project  emphasis. 
The changing emphasio on t h i s  object ive  oeems a l s o  t o  have bad a 
s i m f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on the  balance of work between the  d i f f e r e n t  sub-projects. 
In  fo rnu l s t i ng  its proposal t o  the Centre, the Technology Policy Group had t o '  
spec i fy  a number of  d i s c r e t e  p ro jec t s  t o  be underteken during the  course of 
the  gran t  period. This vno done more than a year before the  work began. A s  . 
mentionod above i n  Section 11; the changing p o l i t i c a l  c l imate  l e d  t o  a 
rev is ion  of tho p o r t f o l i o  of  sub-projects. Following discussions  with 
D r .  Oldlian, and with t h e  f u l l  agroeaent of t he  Centre, two of the f i v e  i n i t i a l  
sub-projects were discontinued and the  funds re-allocated t o  the  remaining 
three  a r ea s  of uork. Thz discontinued sub-projects were the  two which were 
of a more d i a m o s t i c  ( o r  'acaderr,ict ) type and which d id  no t  involve any 
immediate planning a c t i v i t y .  
I n  t h i s  way, the  re inforced object ive  of seeking r ap id  and v i s i b l e  r e s u l t s  
a l t e r e d  t he  i n i t i a l  balance within  the  project  between research a c t i v i t y  and 
planning a c t i v i t y .  He were, and remain, f u l l y  sympathetic t o  the  reasons f o r  
t h i s  change. Yowever, one should not fo rge t  t he  important r o l e  t h a t  had been 
played before and durifig Phase I by diagnost ic  research r e l a t e d  t o  pene ra l  
pol icy concerns. I n  r e t ro spec t ,  we wonder whether the  reduced weight of research  
within t h e  whole a e t  of a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  Pro jec t  was appropria te  from the  
IDRC's noint  of view. Ve wonder whether i t  might have been possible  t o  f i n d  
soae a r r a ~ g e m e ~ t  uhere5y t h e  balsnce of research a c t i v i t y  wi thin  t he  t o t a l  
might have been maintained, while a t  t he  same time maintaining the  a b i l i t y . o f  
the  Technology Pol icy Group t o  respond as i t  f e l t  appropria te  t o  the  changing 
s i tuat ion. '  For example, would i t  perhaps have been poss ib le  t o  arrange some 
form of subcontracted execution of the  discontinued research p r o j e c t s  while 
re inforc ing  the  research-based planning a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  group d i r e c t l y  
se rv ic ing  the  Andean Pact? 
IUHC-su;.,!~artcd llosc:i?'cl~ p r o j c c h  uzuolly inCOl'pOrnto ob jec t ives  oGLL.r z; l .~ ! !  
t h ~ l s c  col!c~~l;i>d :::i.i;h t h e  rc!cr-:lrch prcduct - bn t h a t  research reports o r  r,::coarc.. 
baood p'lnns. '~ ' r : i in in~ and co~rc~u!licn Lion of succcucful resonrch rocu l t o  t o  
other croups, zro tvo ~ u c h  objcctivoo. 
t The f inal .  p ro j ec t  proposal incorporated spc i f  i c  reference t o  t h r c e  types  
of t r a i n i n g  a c t i v i t y  that would be involved i n  t h e  Phaue I1 p ro j ec t .  
(a) ~ r a i n i n g '  of those  r ec ru i t ed  t o  the  Technology Pol icy  Group of t he  
Junta. 
.. 
(b) Tra in ing  of  technology pol icy  research and implementing personnel 
i n  t he  member cowl t r i es  of  t h e  Pact .  
( c )  Training of  pcrscnnel  who would be involved i n  fol lowing up and 
i m p l e ~ o n t i n ~  the  var ious  opera t iona l  plans. 
We raise no questiono about the  appropr ia teness  of those  obJec t ives  as 
such. They seem a d d r a b l y  a l i gned  with IDRC ob jec t ives ,  However, i t  is  
worth not ing t h a t  the o r j  .?inn1 d r a f t  proposals  from the Junta r e f e r r e d  only 
t o  trainine;  i n  t he  l a s t  of  t h e  throe  ca t eeo r i e s ,  R p l i c i t  reference t o  the 
first two was a r e s u l t  of  d iscuss ions  of t h i s  i n i t i a l  proposal  between tire 
Centre and t he  Jun ta ,  I t  soems appropr ia te ,  then, t o  quest ion how f i r m l y  
committed t he  Jun t a  was t o  these  two sub-objectives concerned wi th  t r a i n i w ,  
The importsncc of this point  i s  re inforced by t he  f a c t  t h a t  no e x p l i c i t  
bud@ a l l o c a t i o n  was made f o r  t r a i n i n g  a c t i v i t i e s .  Those were t o  be  c a r r i e d  
ou t  by t he  core  p o u p  of  f o u r  researchers  whose c o s t s  were t o  be covered by 
t h e  Jun t a  block con t r ibu t ion  t o  tho p ro j ec t  funding. This  should be borne 
i n  mind when we review below the  a c t u a l  performance of t he  p ro j ec t -w i th  
r e spec t  t o  t r a in ing .  
The proposal f o r  Phase I1 made no e x p l i c i t  mention of t he  disseminat ion 
of research r e s u l t s  t o  an audience nidcr  than t h a t  within the  Pact  coun t r i e s  
t h a t  would be imnediately concerned with  t h e  work of t he  Technology Po l icy  
Group. It i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  ob jcc t ive  was l a r g e l y  taken f o r  granted. Th i s  
is q u i t e  understandable. A t  t h e  t i n e  t h e  proposal was bein& developed and 
discussed,  work hod a l ready  begun on t he  two IDRC-published re o r t s  on t h e  
work of  Phase I. A t  t h e  same time, the  D i r ec to r  of  the Group ! D r .  ~ a i t s o s )  
had a l r eady  b e p n  publ ishing papers and books drawing on t he  work c a r r i e d  o u t  
by t h e  Group. There seemed no reason t o  doubt that a a imi la r  set  of a c t i v i t i e s  
would follow from Phase 11. I n  r e t ro spec t ,  however, and bearing i n  mind t h e  
pressures t h a t  can be (and, i n  this case,  were) brought t o  bear  on a r e sea r ch  
ectivi t y  t h a t  i s  very c l o s e l y  l inked t o  a policy-making i n s t i t u t i o n ,  we c sns ide r  
t h a t  i t  mieht have been u se fu l  t o  heve made this  type of ob jec t ive  more 
e x p l i c i t  i n  some way. 
We rrholchourtcdly nj~prove of the ovcrnll  dcoien of the stratec. .~ f o r  
rcscnrcl~,  c u ~ l y u i s ,  po l i c j  dcvclopmo!ll; and p l a ~ ~ n i n g  tha t  guided the rluvclop:.~~t 
of the vhole Yi60i:r.umtne of uork ( ~ l l a s c s  I and I1 toeether). This s t ra tegy - 
was conccivcd a s  one whicll prodrcss3d systcmutically, and i n  an integrated 
manner, from tho conera1 t o  the specific.  I n i t i a l  work, la rge ly  i n  Phase I ,  
wae concerned essen t i a l ly  with the diagnosis of general problems and with the  
formulation of broad policy guidelines. It was, however, based on very spec i f i c  
pieces of research, and was inforaed by the  awareness of problems t h a t  would 
have t o  bo tackled a t  a detai led level. The work i n  Phase I1 drew on the more 
general d i a ~ ~ o u c s  ond moved forward t o  the def in i t ion  of more spec i f i c  
a c t i v i t i e s  which would both reinforce the broad policy approaches and be 
consietent with them. 
This s t ra tegy of research may seem so  self-evidently sensible  as not t o  
merit any connent. However, i t  is  surpris ingly unusual. ' Much technology 
policy research, and even more science policy research, has been concerned with 
general diagnosis and, a t  beot, with broad policy formulation. Too often,  i t  
has gone no fur ther .  On the other hand, there has been much research i n  t h i s  
area t h a t  hat re la ted  only t o  very narrow policy problems. To the extent  that 
i t  has l e d  t o  a l te red  policy and pract ice,  i t  has too often amounted t o  
'ad-hoccery' t h a t  has been inconsistent both with other pieces of 'ad-hoccery' 
and with the broader context of policy and pract ice i n t o  which i t  has been 
inserted. 
We a r e  not suggesting t h a t  the whole s e t  of pol ic ies  and plans emanating 
from the research by the Policy Group of the  Andean Pact i s  
comprehensively integrated within i t s e l f  and in te r re l a t ed  with other  policy 
s t ruc tures  i n  the sub-region. However, the overal l  design of the work seems 
t o  havo been concerned with t h e t  a s  an idea l ,  and i n  pract ice i t  has taken some 
signif icant  s teps  towards achieving the t  idoal.  
Equally aclnirnble, and perhaps equally self-evidently sensible  but  unusual, 
has been the conception of the approach t o  technology policy research. Much 
research i n  t h i r  a rea ,  and too much of the  consequential approaches t o  policy, 
have been based on a conception of the problem area tha t  cuts  i t  up inappropriatel:?. 
Phase 11 of the work of the Andean Pact Group was based on a perception of t h e  
r e a l i t i e s  of the world i n  which d i f ferent  typss of technoloeical a c t i v i t y  are 
interlinked ani interdependent. The acquisi t ion of f o r e i m  technology, the 
execution of loca l  R 8: D,  the loca l  dissemination of technology and techniques, 
the dovelopiient of technological capabi l i t ies ,  the supply of engineering 
~ e r v i c e s  and the production of cap i t a l  goods were not,  f o r  example, seen as 
'separate problezs'. 
The design of the rcsearch and planning was based on sub-divisions of 
the  production system i n t o  sec tors  and subsectors. Each of the sub-projects, 
and each of the  sub-divisions of work within those, was focussed on such a 
production-centred problem area. To a la rge  extent each of these un i t s  of 
research and planning work was then concerned with a s e t  of i n t e r r e l a t e d  
technological a c t i v i t i e s .  
Fair ly  o\rvio!izly, t!lj.u ~OnCcptual bas is  f o r  t11e approach t o  tho rc:~c:nrch 
could not be Cot:! l l y  cs:~;jl.cI.c:~rivc. Cot a tlic! t cchno lo~ ica l  activities 
re la t inc  t o  thc ~,~rfor:::inco of a sub-coctor of tho economy were dea l t  w i t h  
within each of t?-2 I L Q ~ ~  Of \fork i n  tlie project.  For example, the 'diescgracution 
- studies  a rc  focu::zed pr inar i ly  on thc a c q u i ~ i  t on of known technology and of 
existing t y ~ e o  01' capi ta l  coods, but they do cut across questions about 
internat ions1 trnnxf e r  of technolocy , loca l  encineering capab i l i t i e s  and the 
local  oupply of ?lsnt  and equipment. Similarly,  the PADT projects  a r e  
primarily concerned with gcnorating new tachnology or  developing now techniques; 
but these a l so  cut  across H spectrum of d i f f e ren t  technological a c t i v i t i e s  that 
more usually a re  approached separately. 
This r a i s e s  one question i n  our minds about the overal l  design of the work 
in Phase I f .  I n  ?rinciple,  i t  would have been possible t o  focus the  PADT 
' d i s a ~ g r e p t i o n ' ,  and information systom sub-projects onto the same sub-sectors 
of the economy, I n  t h i s  way, the d i f ferent  sub-projects would have d i roc t lg  
reinforced each other. To a cer ta in  extent t h i s  already happened, This was 
mainly a s  a r e s u l t  of overlaps between the information system work and each 
of the  other two act ive areas,  However, the PADT and disaggroeation etudies  
hid not overlap, and did not seem d i r e c t l y  t o  complement each other,  
We wonder, therefore,  whether the overa l l  design of the  Phase I f  project  
s i g h t  have taken a more integrated approach - a t  l e a s t  f o r  part of the work 
undertaken. I f  the group has i n  mind the development of integrated approaches 
t o  long-tam, sectoral,  technology planning, then i t  might have been useful  t o  
'experiment' with t h i s  a t  a f a i r l y  ea r ly  s tage,  and t o  examine the  methods and 
problems involved. Perhaps t h i s  is an area where the weight of the 'short-term 
pay-off' objective influenced the  overal l  design of the  research strrrtsgy. 
I n  the  case of the PADT work we d id  meet the s t a f f  responsible f o r  the  
research, anallrois ond plan formulation f o r  three PADTe, However, the  
methodology involve3 i n  the i r  work still remains something of a mystery t o  us. 
Perhaps t h i s  i s  because, except a t  a general level ,  i t  was highly variable  
between the d i f ferent  PJDTs. A t  the detai led l eve l  the process of work seems 
t o  have been la ree ly  ad hoc - depending mainly on the exis t ing  howledge and 
previous experience of the individual concerned, and on the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of 
the necessary inforaation. 'Ad &' does not mean 'bad*. Adequacy f o r  the job 
on hand, ra ther  than adequacy f o r  the formali t ies  of more academic research, 
seems t o  have been the dominant c r i t e r ion  i n  determining the methodoiogy used. 
Again, t o  the extent tha t  we can judge from resu l t s ,  t h i s  approach seems t o  
have been qui te  s ~ c c e s s f u l .  
Given the  trature of the sub-projects in,  Phase 11, we should be concerned 
not  only with the loethodology of research, but a l so  with the  methods used t o  
move on from these to  produce plan proposals. However, here again we remain 
a l i t t l e  i n  the dark. I n  oc t l ine  four phases seem t o  be involved. F i r s t ,  t he  
analysis of the information t o  produce an outline o r  d r a f t  plan. Second, the  
revicn of t h i s  from thc point o f  vjcw of d i f  fo!*cnt d i sc ip l ines  kiithin the  
Tochno1o~:y Policy Cro:iy. Tllir.d, t h e  discussion and ~nodif icat ion of the d r a f t  
with thc  d i f  f won t  i n s  ti tu t ions  . Finally,  the t ransf  ormo t ion  of an : t~rccd 
plan of act ion i n t o  tlls l ega l  f o r m ~ ~ l ~ ~ t i o n  necos3nry f o r  submission to  the 
Cotmission. The second nnd t h i r d  s tcps  ucrc not necessar i ly  sequential .  
Indeed, they seem t o  21clve overlnppcd i n  nost cases. However, we do not  r e a l l y  
know i n  any do tn i l  what hoppecs i n  these s teps .  Once acain,  we can only 
comment tha t ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  the case of the two PADTs t h a t  have passed through 
those s teps ,  whatever the method may be, i t  seems t o  work. 
It should be obvious t h a t  much of the output of t h e  Phase I1 project  
oon8ists of policy innovations - almost policy experiments. These a r e  
novel t ies  not only within the  sub-=&ion, but within the  developing world a s  
a whole. A t  the  sane t i n e ,  tho Technology Policy Group within t h e  Pact is, 
a s  we have notod above, under pressure t o  demonstrate dovolopmental r e s u l t s  - rapidly.  Both of these i s sues  r a i a e  a question about methodology a t  t h e  
l e v e l  of design of the s t ruc tu re  of the work programme. Experiments merit  
monitoring, and the need t o  demonstrate r e s u l t s  requires  t h a t  those r e s u l t s  
be iden t i f iod  and, i f  possible,  meaoured i n  some way. 
The Technology Pol icy Group can already point t o  cases  of developmental 
'impact' of t h e i r  work, and they plan t o  accumulate t h i s  type of information 
a s  i t  bocomcs nvailnble. However, t h i s  monitoring a c t i v i t y  seems t o  be r e l a t i v e l y  
unsyetematic. It is  certainly not ' se t  up as a spec i f i c  sub-area of research 
a c t i v i t y ,  Even t o  meot t h e i r  own p o l i t i c a l  requirements, t he  group w i l l  need 
t o  ensure tha t  the information about impact i s  ( a )  reasonably comprehensive, 
and (b) convincingly credible.  I n  e f f e c t ,  they must be ab le  t o  note: 
- t h a t  t he  a rea  of economic a c t i v i t y  t o  which t h e i r  work r e l a t e s  has 
i n  f a c t  changod i n  some way; 
- t h a t ,  taking account of the various complementary changes and cos t s  . 
involved, the net  changes a re  valuable; and 
- t h a t  t h e  chmges can be reasonably ascribed t o  t h e i r  own work and 
not  simply t o  the  passage of time or. s o l e l y  t o  the  work of other  
agencies. 
The need f o r  c r e d i b i l i t y  and comprehensiveness i s  reinforced by the  f a c t  
t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  and economic forces  t h a t  a r e  opposed t o  the work of the  Pact 
a r e  mounting an increasingly e x p l i c i t  offensive to  demonstrate the d e s i r a b i l i t y  
of policy eppronches o ther  than those cur ren t ly  pursued by the  Pact. 
Comprehensive and credible  re\riews of 'impact' will be a l l  the  more necessary. 
This i n  turn i s  reinforced by the  possible s ignif icance of t h e i r  work f o r  o the r  
pa r t s  ,of the developing world. 
We wonder, theref ore,  whether the design of the research po r t fo l io  of t h e  
Andean Pact Croup should not  a l ready have incorporated an element of work t o  
meet the  needs f o r  reasonably systematic monitoring of t h e  'impect' 'of t h e i r  
work. 
T!ic success of any ro:~crircIt pro j cc t ,  includir.:: i ts  pol icy impact, ut,.vLol2sl; 
I dcpcnds on t h c  a : t : t l i  t y  of t l i k :  rcocarcll tcs:n, t h e i r  i n t a r r e l t r t i o n s h i ~ ~ s  , o:, I t k ~  r o l a t i c ~ n s h i l ~ s  t!~cy devclop \ r i t ! ~  0 t h -  croups. It is worthwhile f o r  1D:iC t o  
ma kc^ so30 acsees:i-cnt of t n i o  i t : .  3ct  of t11c Andean Pact Pro jec t ,  s ince  i t  nr:y - - a f f e c t  the  i'uturc pa t te rns  of, organis2tion of other  research pro jec t s ,  and - 
eincc i t  a l s o  hcis funding implica.tions. 
Tho Andean Poct  t e a  wao i n t e rd i s c ip l i na ry ,  and consis ted of both nn tu ra l  
and s o c i a l  scientists, engineers  and ltr\.ryors. Tho in t e rd i s c ip l i na ry  na ture  
was considered t o  b very important by the  team i t s e l f .  I t  c l e a r l y  had been 
pa r t i cu l a r ly  re lcvant  i n  g e t t i n g  tho mult idiscipl inary commentary on a l l  t he  
proposals f o r  pol icy which were made. It was d i f f i c u l t  f o r  us ,  as ou ts iders ,  
t o  judge how tho t e r n  acted i n  an i n t e rd i s c ip l i na ry  manner dur ing t h e  research 
phase. During the  f i r e t  phase of the  project  there  nae a s u f f i c i e n t  umber  of 
people (botuecn eleven and fourteen) t o  h v e  r e a l i t y  t o  t h e  claim of  
interri isciplinori+;y.  However, a t  the  present time i n  Phase I f ,  t he re  a r e  only 
two f u l l  time mcubars working on technolo~y.  An i n t e rd i s c ip l i na ry  approach 
t o  tho work i s  c lon r ly  impoesible a t  this l e v e l  of staffine;, hithough we 
understnnd t h a t  the  team of two is ab le  t o  draw on the exper t i se  of peoplo 
from other  departments i n  the  Junta  when this is  needeb. 
The low l eve l  of s t a f f i n g  of the Pro jec t  no t  only a f fec ted  the  a b i l i t y  t o  
ca r ry  out i n t e rd i s c i2 l i na ry  work i n  the  corltext of an enthusiastic ' ,  l i v e l y  
team. It c l e a r l y  F . A ~  a negntive e f f e c t  on t he  a b i l i t y  of t h e  group t o  meet 
many of i t s  o ther  ob jec t ives  - at l e a s t  wi thin  t he  foreseeable fu tu re ,  There 
were two compor~e~lto of t h i s  u?<erstiiffing s i t ua t i on .  On t h e  one hand, t he  
nuntbcr of  full-ti:nr. core s t a f f  s u p ~ o r t e d  bj Jmta funds was below t h a t  planned, 
On t h c  o1;her hand, t he  use of D R C  funds t o  enploy personr.el f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  
Phase 11 sub-projects was o k ~ i o u s l y  f a r  behind what was planned - even 
fol1o;:ing the  rescheduling a f t e r  t he  delayed start. 
We have a l ready ind ica ted  a number of reasons why ex t e rna l  events  had 
l e d  t o  a slow-do:rn of t h e  vcr ious  sub-projects. Not only d id  t h e  changinc 
p o l i t i c a l  cl imate f o r  the  work c rea te  a need f o r  s t a l l i n g  o r  r eo r i en t ing  eome 
of tho work. Perhaps oven more s i m i f i c n n t  has been the  e x t r a  time which meolbers 
of  the  team have hnd t o  spend i n  t ry ing  t o  c o n ~ i n c e  p o l i t i c i a n s  of t h e  mer i t s  
of  t h e i r  technoloey pol icy proposals. This was a much more time-consuring 
a c t i v i t y  than any of the  menbers hed or ig ina l ly  es t iaated.  To t h i s  should be 
added, of course, t he  recent  change i n  t h e  Di rec tor  of the  Programme and a 
consequent delay while t he  new Director  eought t o  reor ien t  and re-plan some of 
t h e  a c t i v i t i e s .  
Thue t h e  lo-i l e v e l  of c o r e  s t a f f  supported by Andean Pact  funds was no t  
only a ~ e r i o u s  l im i t a t i on  i n  i t s e l f ,  i t  was a l s o  a severeconstra int  on t he  
a b i l i t y  t o  use IDRC funds as planned. The Phase I1 proposal had envisaged the  
commitment of $130,000 per  year  by t h e  Jun ta  t o  support a core group o f  f o u r  o r  
f ive  rcccnr.cli st11 fi', ]:luu n f 111~tlic.c $50,030 for ~ e c ~ c ~ l ; i i r i u l  a s s i o  Lance ccnd 
clcppli er.,'" 1 t \Inn i!Ui'i. 12 :App'll:C:l! b t ) r i . ~ t  t ) ~ c :  it(.: i : l l l ~ l  ~ C V C ~  of l o c ~ l l  f\rnding \\r:la 
runnilif; frs tolow t;kjo lit the  t.i:.e;* of ou?. r-cu.i.cw, and hod boon doinc: so  for  
sotfig til!;e, T h i s  i:;suo !la:, dincu::::\;d w i t 1 1  ~ I I G  of the  three membei-o of the 
Junta a t  thc cnd of 0111- rcvica,  :.!incc. i t  c1c::rly r c f l e c t s  o decreased 
cormit~:tent t o  thc  to to1  pxbojoct oil t h e  pl't ~f the Andean Pact,** We were 
rrvsurcd t ; l .~ l~t  one additianii l  post; has been al.located f o r  the technology policy 
team but i t  i s  unlikely thvt  i t  uj.11 grow beyond this eize i n  the immediate 
future. 
/ 
011tpui; from the  ProJcct 
Given the deluys t o  the work programme tha t  have affected the  Phase I1 
project ,  i t  probably is  too cor ly  t o  make dotailed comments on the  various 
'outputs'  of tho work, Nevertheless, i t  i s  possible t o  make some preliminary 
remarks about three typos of output: pol icy impact, research r e s u l t s ,  and 
trainint.,  
( i )  Policy Impact 
We would wish t o  s t r e s s  once ae;&n that both Phases I and I1 of the Andem 
Pact Technology Pol icy work were not purely research projects.  The main 
objectivu was t o  formulate pol ic ies  (mainly Plmse I)  and t o  develop operational 
plans (mainly Phase 11). Rouearch, a s  a component of the work programme, was 
t o  be a means to  those ends. 
There can be l i t t l e  doubt about the  policy impact of t h i s  project. It 
must rank a s  one of the    no st productive of a l l  I D R C  pro jec ts  from this point 
of view, Phase I resul ted i n  tho White Paper and the  Decisions 84 and 85. 
Phaee I1 ha8 already led t o  several  opecif ic  Technology Development Pro~;rammes. 
Indeed t h e  project  Ins received in te rna t iona l  recognition a s  a pioneering 
e f f o r t  of significance t o  the  whole of the  developing world. 
I n  any context, these ac tua l  and potent ia l  achievements i n  developing 
accepted po l i c i e s  and plans f o r  technological development would be remarkable. 
In  the context of the  complicated decision-making processes of a regional  
grouping of d i f fe r ing  nation-states,  and i n  the context of a f luc tua t ing  
p o l i t i c a l  context f o r  mch a grouping, these achievements a r e  even more 
impressive, 
(ii) Research Results 
Just a s  the whole pro jec t  was not so l e ly  a research exercise,  i t  was not 
so le ly  a po l icyaaking  exercise  e i ther .  Par t  of the work should have 
contributed t o  new knowledge about the relevant phenomena, about methods of 
analyning problem areas ,  o r  about methods of moving from diagnoses t o  planned 
solutions. 
* bne should perhaps note t h a t  t h i s  l eve l  of l oca l  funding had been 
indicated i n  the  f i r s t  proposal from the Junta, It was not the  r e s u l t  of a 
subsequent discussions with IDRC,  
** We do not b o w  whether t h i s  r e f l e c t s  a decreased commitment t o  the  technology 
policy work r e l a t i v e  t o  other  a c t i v i t i e s  of the Pact or  whether i t  r e f l e c t s  
a reduced al locat ion of resources t o  the  Pact ' s  work as a whole. 
jjouevcr, i n  v i i ! \ 5  of t!,c! cf~t~:;i('ler:iLlc B U I ~  of llioriey Snvoated Loth by tile 
I D H C  L::L~ the i..nilc.:.iu p:cct:, j.t :;ccIn:; to  us tliat tlic t o t a l i t y  of the publir;llcd r 0 3 L i L .  
output j.s surpris i  r 1 i . 1 ~  u]~.'lroc.. 
Theae ~ e l ' l e r a 3 i t : : i n s  ln~lct inmcdiatc1.y be qualifiod. These comments arc: 
much less t rue  of Pkctsc I thnn of Phase 11. The former generated rrome new 
d o h  about thc way technology wae used i n  the region; it developed new concepts 
relevrrnt both to  dirtgnooixi~ problem areds and t o  fornulating solutions; and 
it explored new methods for  dcvclopinl: policy in i t ih t ives .  A second qual i f icat ion 
must obviously be tha t  thc work planned f o r  Phaee I1 i e  f a r  from complete. 
t!othodological reports w i l l  bc prepoi-ed f o r  the PADT and disaggregation studies.  
Those a r e  l i ke ly  t o  make new contributions t o  knowledge. 
Whether a more apocific concern with research output would have been 
desirable i s  hard to  say. The team consj.sted of research oriented people, some 
of whome simultaneouvly wrote and.publishod more academic books and papers 
outside the acopo of tho programme. The o f f i c i a l  view of the Junta is tha t  
t h e i r s  i s  not an academic i n s t i t u t i o n  and hence, tha t  they would accord a 
r e l a t ive ly  low p r io r i ty  t o  the production of research resu l t s .  However, from 
I D R C t s  point of view, and from the point of view of other  countries wishing t o  
draw on the Andem Pact experience, i t  would probably have been useful t o  have 
had a somewhat clearer  a r t icu la t ion  of resoarch output. 
( i i i )  Training of Renearchers and Education of Policy-Makers 
An important feature of a l l  IDRC projects  i s  considered t o  be the 
t ra in ing  aspect. Several leve ls  of t ra in ing  and education were considered by 
the Andean Pact team. 
( a )  The t raining of researchers capable of doing s tudies  and research 
on technology policy problcms. 
When Phase I of the project began, re la t ive ly  few of the members of 
the  la rge  team had p r io r  experience of doing technology policy 
research. I t  was decided that most of the t ra in ing  tha t  would be 
provided f o r  these people would be on-the-job training. I n  addition, 
however, a number of more formal seminars clnd guided reading programmes 
wero established. This seems t o  have worked very s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  
during Phase I. During Phase 11 of the project,  however, r e l a t ive ly  
few people were engaged i n  the project and these were people with 
considerable experience. Hence fur ther  specif ic  t ra in ing  a c t i v i t i e s  
were not carried out. I t  seems t o  us that an excellent opportunity 
f o r  t ra in ing  young people, capable of continuing the s o r t  of studies/  
policy formulation a c t i v i t i e s  of the Pact htrs been missed. 
(b) Education of national go&rnments and policy makers i n  the r o l e  
of technoloey i n  development. 
This was seen ae an important task by members of the technology 
polioy team. They recognised tha t  without a climate of opinion 
favourable t o  technology there would be l i t t l e  chance of the  technologic 
decisions of the Pact being approved and implemented. A s  a consequence, 
members of the  team gave a number of ta lks  and part ic ipated i n  
seminars a t  which they attempted t o  spread the message of science, 
technology and developnent. 
( o )  Eh~ci: t ion a n d  tr:i:ilrirl~~ of' niltiofin1 (;roups worlrine 011 L L ~ ~ . , , ~ , ? ~  . 
pli cy ~~roLlt:~:lo. 
There coc~us t o  huvc Lccn re1at:ivoly l i t t l e  i n t e r a c t i o n  Letr.rcu~i E.;: 
6 t u d i . c ~  carr ied  oltt a t  a nil t i ona l  lovo l  by na t ionu l  government 
mouj~o.  Cc r to i~ l l y  there is l i t t l e  evidcnce of people from na t iona l  
group3 r o c e i v i r ~ ~ .  11:1 form of' t r a i n i n g  at  the  Jun ta  headquartern i n  
Liu.3. T U B  i s  i n  paln'; expluinsd by lack of resources  and higher 
p r i o r i t i e s  f o r  tha tiale of  people ernploycd. Ve were t o l d  on more 
than ono occasion thi l t  t h e  Jun ta  is no t  an academic institution 
and hence that generul  education,  l i k e  research,  must hove a r e l a t i v e l y  
low p r io r i t y .  
I n  our  own view - l a r g e l y  because o f ,  and no t  i n  s p i t e  o f ,  t he  e e n e r a  
ob jec t ives  of tho eroup - t h i s  m y  be an  over ly  narrow perspective. 
On t h e  one hand acceptance and t he  implementation of the  p o l i c i e s  
and procrommcu put forward by the  Pact  depend on the  enthusiasm mid 
a c t i v e  suppor t 'of  those ongaeed i n  technology policy work a t  the  
na t iona l  l eve l .  Had na t i ona l  technology policy groups been 1nvoI.ved 
i n ,  and educated about, the  de t a i l ed  research and planning work of 
the  Jun ta  group, this might have contributed s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  
developing t h a t  enthusiasm and support. 
Furthermore, i n  our wider d iscuss ions  with a number of people ew6e;ed 
i n  technology pol icy  work i n  d i f f e r e n t  countr ies  i n  tho region,  we 
were made aware of a degree o f  resentment aga ins t  t he  Technology 
Po l i cy  Group of  the  Pact .  A s  o f t en  as not ,  t h i s  reson1;ment was no t  
ao much based on d i f fe rences  about t h e  substant ive  content  of t he  work 
being done a e  on tho view t h a t  i t  was being done by a c en t r a l i s ed  
'them1 without much involvement o f  the  decentra l ised 'us ' .  These 
views may not m t t e r  very  much, and there  may be many reasons f o r  
t h e i r  existence.  However, we bel ieve  t h a t  t h e i r  exis tence  adds at . 
least some weieht t o  our  be l i e f  t h a t  the  development of t r a in ing /  
educational  l i n k s  between the  Pact  Group and o the r  technology pol icy  
groups i n  the  region might have been de s i r ab l e  - even from the  point  
of view of t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  ob jec t ives  of the  Sec r e t a r i a t .  
(d) Education and t r a i n i n g  of researchers  and pol icy  makers ou t s ide  t h e  
region. 
When t he  IDRC Board approved Phaae I of the  Andean Pact ,  a reques t  
was made by some of tho Governors t h a t  the lessons  and r e s u l t s  of 
t h i s  project  be d i s s e m i n ~ t e d  widely among o the r  groups i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  technology and regional  in tegra t ion ,  This  request  was relayed 
t o  the  technology pol icy  group i n  Lima and they  have responded we l l  
t o  requests  f o r  help  i n  dissemination and t r a i n ing ,  Members o f  t he  
team have a s s i s t e d  wi th  the  de f i n i t i on  of research programmes i n  
technology po l icy  s t u d i e s  i n  Central  America, and have also-gcovided -. 
t ' m i n i ~  and a t tended seminars organised by the.IDR_CZ_su~~ortod 
carib6Z8ri-W~maro~~~~P~oli~y Reseaich Croup;---'In add i t ion ,  they have 
meeiiportant- iriput s to- d iscuss ions  within t h e  United Nations, 
e spec i a l l y  a t  UNCTAD. 
With spcc:i r i c  rei'e~cncc. t o  12kitue 11, br .  Sot0 was quite prepared 
t o  exploro i : i L ! i  t h e  Ct*nti.c ways i l l  v l~ i ch  the experielice of t h e  
Andean Puct Ct.oup could LC d i s s o ~ ~  i ~ ~ l i t e d  Inore widely within the 
Third World. 4 
( c )  Education and truinint! of tl~otie wko w i l l  be involved i n  deta i led 
imyle1~16ntution of the p lms  deve l~ j~ot l  by thc Croup. 
The Jun ta  group has bocn qu i te  ac t i ve ly  involved i n  developing the  
skills and capabi l i t i ev  of tliooo ollgaC;%d i n  the#irnplemcntation yhaoo 
of the  pro&runres, f o r  example i n  the copper and fo re s t ry  PADTs. 
Even i n  the  pre-implementation phaoc, they h v o  been involved i n  
this type of  a c t i v i t y  - f o r  e r u p l e ,  i n  connection with the i n fo rmt ion  
system project .  
The iosue of t r a in ing  obviously poses t he  Jruita with a eer ious  dilemma. 
Given more resources, more t r a i n i w  might huve boen provided. But equally,  
given more resources,  more experienced peoplo could have been hired,  who 
couad have helped t o  develop new PADTs and new schemes of disaggregation. 
There i s  a con f l i c t  of i n t e r e s t s  and i t  is not  eaay t o  pass judgement on 
whether t h e  r i g h t  balance was a t ta ined.  
In  hindsight,  we would have preferred more time t o  have been spent on 
t ru in ing  youncer people who wou1.d eo on t o  become r e s e a r ~ h e r s / ~ o l i c ~  mnkers 
i n  the  f i e l d  of sc ience and technoloey pol icy research. The appropriateness of 
t h i s  view i s  perhaps indicated by the  constrt t ints on progress t h a t  seem t o  be 
imposed by the  cur ren t  workload of the  small core group of researchera - 
eapec ia l ly  following the  resignntiori of t h e  prcvious Director.  
Also i n  hindsight,  there  would have been i n  our est imation,  advantages 
from es tab l i sh ing  cloaor linltagea with the  nat ional  groups working on 
technology policy problem8 and those linkages night have included t r a in ing  
opportuni t ies  f o r  people from tho c o ~ m t r i e s  t o  work with the  team i n  Lima. 
Em Relation8 Between the I D R C  and the  Andean Pact 
The ro la t ionsh ip  between the  Andean Pact Technology Pol icy Group and 
the  I D R C  has remained cord ia l  t h r o u ~ h o u t  the  f i v e  years of the project .  
Howover, i t  must be reco~mised  t h a t  the  IDRC took a s tance of non-involvement 
i n  the conduct of t h e  research which is more l i b e r a l  than i n  the  case of many 
of the  pro jec t s  which t he  Centre supports. The reason f o r  this was the  high 
l eve l  of competence of  the  s c i e n t i s t s  involved i n  the  Andean Pact Pro jec t  and 
the l eve l  of t r u s t  i n  t h e i r  judgement which t he  I D R C  possessed. 
The IDRC Associate Di rec tor  f o r  Science and Technology Policy Research 
monitored t he  progress of t he  Andean Pact team a t  about six-monthly in te rva l s .  
This was through an exchange of correspondence between Vclitsos and himself, and 
by means of periodic v i s i t s  t o  Lima by Oldham and during the annual v i s i t s  of 
Vaitaos t o  Suseex. The l e v e l  of t r u s t  and freedom was appreciated by the  
Andean Pact team and has contributed t o  t he  continuing good r e l a t i ons ,  even 
when the  o r ig ina l  l eader  of the  programme l e f t  t he  Group and a successor was 
appointed. However, one point  became half-apparent during t he  review. The 
l i n k  between the  Centre and the  Technology Policy Group had been confined 
near ly  exclusively  t o  t he  personal communication between the  D R C  Associate 
Director  and the  Di rec tor  of t h e  Group. Moreover, these  communications had 
tokcil place lnrt;e1-jr by ~~l ' l 'u : ; l~ l j~ :dc? ic :e  : ~ i i J  \ i ~  !r;c'cincs outside Lima. This was 
not L:O ~ I I U C ~  by clcbzign :IS t.110 rc:::llL c1.l' (:;) i;i:c for tunate  foc t  t ha t  
D r .  Vnitsos fro:!?~cntly vio:i tr :d C!i~:ic*j:, :!nd (L) the  unfortuntrte f a c t  that .  
D r .  Olilham'r; a \ ra i la t le  timc jus t  d i d  t :o t  jb; ;~ .~ . i t  t .1 :~  development of a KICJI-e 
diversified s c t  elf coi?i;nct:.: w i t h  the cr.oilp t k z o u ~ ] ~  !:,ore frequent visits t o  
Lima. 
The nature of t h i s  re lut ionshiy betwoen the Centre and the Project  gave 
rise t o  po ten t ia l  d i f f i c u l t j c a  when the Directorship of the Group changed 
hands. The chance t o  mact during the review quickly removed ttlose. I t  ic a l s o  
probable t h a t  more frcquent v i e i t s  t o  L i n ~ a  would Iuve enable tile Centre t o  
have e a r l i e r  warning of 8olao of the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  facud by the group, and may 
have allowed the Centre t o  have given c u r l i e r  ass is tance i n  overcoming sonic of 
t lieu. 
One aspect of these good r e l a t i ons  wae s t reasod t o  us during our review. 
The Andean Pact Technology Policy team paid t r i b u t e  t o  the  I D R C  administration 
for Its f l e x i b l e  approoch and willingness t o  consider the real locat ion of 
resources when chaneine circumstances led t o  a need to  change the Phase I1 
p r i o r i t i e s  and project  s t ruc ture .  The a b i l i t y  to  discuss problems on a 
professional basis  between the  team and the I D R C  made the  grut more of a 
programme grant  and t h i s  was recognised to  be of great benef i t  t o  the  work. 
That t h i s  was possible was i n  no emall measure due t o  the  high competence of 
t he  t e r n  and the  t r u s t  t h a t  IDRC s t a f f  had i n  t h e i r  judgements. 
IV, SO;.?E LF:';;rJOifi v!nrf ;.i!.'r ------- ;?E J,f<LK:!11".1) BY II)hC 
I n  the previous ~ e c L i o n s  xe h:rvc t r i e d  t o  l ay  the boois f o r  drnlrini: 
out some of the  leszoii:: t h ~ t  n~ny Lo loctrned frcm t h i s  roview of the '  
Andcan IJ~LC~/IIJRC Project ,  I n  mhl:in2 t h i s  ansocsmont we have t r i o d  t o  be cis 
frank as possible. T h b r u  is 110 n o d  f o r  the rorrdcr to search 'between the 
l ines '  of' tlie previous sec t ions  f o r  vei led c f i t i c i sms  t h a t  r e a l l y  go fur ther  
than is  indicated. We l~avc t r i o d  t o  uake our subjective judgements qu i te  
expl ic i t .  Othero may disagree with our judebments, and they mayhavo o thers  
t o  make, but we hope tha t  tho3 noed not look f o r  'pulled punches'. , 
This  means tha t  our p n e r a l  aetlcsament of t h i e  pro3ect was f i rmly posi t ive .  
~ l t h o u ~ h  we r a i s e  questions about eoue aspects ,  we responded t o  the discuosions 
with ent11usiac;m and with considerable respect  f o r  what has been achieved and 
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f o r  those who have achieved it. We have no hes i ta t ion  i n  recording our view 
t h a t ,  oven before i t  i e  colnpleted, t h i s  hae been a most impressive project .  
Ovorall, then, the main lesson i s  t h a t  the rrupport of t h i s  proJect has been a 
&ood, and well  managed a l loca t ion  of  Centre resources. 
Furthermore it i l l u s t r a t e s  the  operational value of science and tochnology 
policy research. There has been a log ica l  progression from pol icy e tudies  
and research which first l ed  t o  the  eetabliehment of broad philosophical  
guidelines about how scionce and technology can beet contribute t o  industr ia l ieat icr  
in the Andean region, Further  research l e d  t o  the design of  plans f o r  
s c i e n t i f i c  and technological a c t i v i t i e s  re levant  t o  the development of spec i f i c  d Indus t r ia l  ljrectors but f a l l i n g  within the previously es tabl ished guidelines,  
Some of these a c t i v i t i e s  included s c i e n t i f i c  research which i t s e l f  fa l ls  
within the scope of other  I D R C  programmes. The fo re s t ry  project  which was 
f o ~ u ~ d e d  a s  a pa r t  of the Agricul tural  Food and Nutr i t ion Division programme 
i s  one snch example. Other of the a c t i v i t i e s  which were 'planned' as a 
rosu l t  of the 'policy' research a r e  productive a c t i v i t i e s  and do not qualip; 
f o r  the  research support. They do however contr ibute  t o  i n d u s t r i a l  development 
and some have qua l i f ied  f o r  support by o ther  donor agencies euch as CIDA. 
The spec i f i c  lessons/recommendations f o r  IDRC which we believe follow from 
t h i s  review are:  
The conduct of reoearch within a policy-making i n s t i t u t i o n ,  and as an 
i n t e g r a l  p a r t  of policy-formulating o r  prqgramme-planning, c l e a r l y  
enhances t he  probabi l i ty  t h a t  policy-relevant research w i l l  a c tua l ly  
have an influence on policy,  and l a t e r ,  on action.  Without los ing 
s igh t  of the  value and importance of other types of technology pol icy 
research t h a t  may be car r ied  out i n  other  types of i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  the 
Centre should continue t o  be ready t o  support t h i s  typo of research -
i n  which research,  a n ~ l y e j s ,  policy-formulation and plannine are 
c l e a r l y  intcrconnccted. I n  addi t ion,  the Centre should. whonever 
approprinte. encourage the establishment and development of research/ 
analysis  groups within i n s t i t u t i o n a l  contexts where t h i s  type of research 
i s  most l i k e l y  t o  flourioh.  
(L) The hldcnrr Fiicl; 1.1roJc:c.t ~.ia~nortntri~ i:$, r.le believe, tho vaI.ue, indeed 
the neccsdity, of bcsi~!::  ~lil.c. to  su!,gol-t t l l i t l  type of worl: by this 
ty l~e  of f:roul:, ovclv u lbcl!1tively lol!:; period. The need f o r  
conti:~91i\.v o f  f un:li,: ,- 2: :I rcui\!c.l.\r ]orly pcl.iod of t i nc  f o r  r, 
i? nn i tc .:~.:~ l.j,.,~,> ~ 2 . 7  bet:.:acn reseerc);, polic:,r 
f onl~ul.atior! r::1.1 I;OS ic:: .i!!,:.l.cac;.~~I:!i tj.o;l is a nc.pJ n];ich sllou ld be 
rocopnir,ed \)a t)!(,! ID?(.:. F'ci!~ t!.~c::c! 1,:rres of c ro jcc t s  it tray be 
nececsn~y t o  ;fl.ovi dn 3 or:-:t-:r-tcrr:l fiu!ding than with projects  which a r c  
so l e ly  conccrnc:-d v i th  ~nr:o:trch. 
(c)  Within this typo of work, the Andeoll Pact project  demonstrots3 the 
need f o r  f l e x i b i l i t y  011 the par t  of both the  t o m  supported and the 
external  supporting tqency. While more academic reseirrcli a c t i v i t y  con 
be disrupted by external  events, i t  i s  usually much more insulated 
from the v ic i s i tudes  of bureaucracies and p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h m  
is research-based planni~ig nnd policy development ac t iv i ty .  However, 
from the  point of view of the Centrc and its respons ib i l i t i es ,  this 
f l e x i b i l i t y  i o  only poosible i f  i t  is  based on an unusually high 
l eve l  of confidence i n  the capab i l i t i e s  of the team concerrred. This 
stlgcests tha t  projects of t h i s  type should not be entered i n t o  l ich t lg .  
However a t t r a c t i v e  they may be i n  .terms of t h e i r  probable devel.ogrr~eni;nl 
ueefulneos they imply a s e t  of commitments, and may generate a s e t  
of problems, tha t  a r e  d i f fe ren t  from, and usually grea te r  than, those 
encountered,in the c m e  of pro jec ts  t h a t  a r e  more s t r i c t l y  concerned 
with research. 
(d) O u r  comments about the t ruining a c t i v i t y  within t h i s  project highlights 
some important issuos.  It seems c l e a r  t ha t  the group accorded a low 
p r i o r i t y  t o  the conduct of t ra in ing  and education - even of technolo~y 
policy analysts  within t h e i r  own group. The inclusion i n  the proposrr!. 
of e x p l i c i t  objectives about t ra in ing  was probably due more t o  
'Centre influence' than t o  t h e i r  own concern with th i s .  Should this 
influence have been exerted? We believe tha t  the answer is nYesw. 
Obviously, Centre s t a f f  should make known t o  po ten t ia l  grant rec ip ien ts  
the general  types of object ives  pursued by the Centre, and the  developaen: 
of skills and capab i l i t i e s  i s  one such objective. Moreover, i n  many 
cases, Centre s t a f f  may have a broad experience of the problems 
poten t ia l s  and achievernonts of a la rge  number of projects .  This may 
include experience of tho value and importance of exp l i c i t  t ra in ing  
a c t i v i t i e s  within projects.  I t  seems qui te  proper t h a t  this experience 
should be made avai lable  t o  applicants f o r  Centre funds.* 
Was the Centre's influence on the question of t ra in ing  most e f fec t ive ly  
exorted? We think tha t  the answer is  probably tlNott. Having ra i sed  
the question of t r a in ing  ( o r  of any other  Centre concern about a 
pro jec t )  Centre s t a f f  face two poss ib i l i t i es .  Their views may be 
disregarded, or they may be accepted. If they are  disregarded there  
is no fu r the r  problem - except t o  assess  whether t h i s  a f f e c t s  t he  
acceptab i l i ty  of t h e  project.  However, i f  they a r e  accepted, the 
implication i s  tha t  fu r the r  act ion may be neceesary. It may be 
necessary t o  help the &rant applicant build t h e  a c t i v i t y  concerned 
* In this par t icu lar  case, the  advantage of hindsight allowe us t o  be even more 
cer ta in  on this point. D r .  Soto and D r .  Vaitaos both a p e e d  with our 
judgement t h a t  a t  l eao t  some of t he  problems faced by the group during l a t e  
1976 would probably have been eased i f  some form of in-house t r a in ing  
a c t i v i t y  had been undertaken a t  an e a r l i e r  stage. 
i n t o  t!,k ~ : ~ I * C ; ~ : ) . - -  1 i n  (I ~ n ~ t ~ t r i l l y  ~ ~ c c e l ~ t e b l e  HAY. I n  t h i s  csac, 
~O\.;UI,L'I*, t l r i !  if;:;:] : S O C ~ C I : ,  t~ IUVC .~.t\lc?: jn a half-way s i t ua t i on .  
Thc prf r.cilllr:  oi' L r n i 1 1 . j  11,: ?:I:IS uccaptod t o  tho point  of making coxe 
~enr.rr11 ~ttLc::.*:ntu i n  t l ~ c  propooal, but the content of the  a c t i v i t y  
un: 11rs r r7 r  SI,CC.~I'.: 0c1, f i ~ l c l  thi: ~ O C ~ L I S Y Z ' : ~  fund a l locu t ions  were not  
clot?rly idc1lt.i l':i ud. They ucr'e ne i t he r  incorporated i n t o  t h e  Centre 
cmponcn*l; of t!:e budcot, nol* ( a s  fur as we know) were they c l e a r l y  
~e~x l l*u t cd  out ns n line-item i n  tho Jun ta  budget. Given the  
i n i t i a l  lack or i n t e r e s t  i n  tho  oubjcct on the  part of the  group 
i t  seems, w i t 1 1  kindaicht,  f a i r l y  predictable t ha t  not mucl~ would 
happen with t h t ?  i s s u e  l e f t  i n  t h i o  ei tuntion.  
Wc tl~areforc.  conclude tr i th the mnera l ina t ion  that .  when prelinlnfiry 
dir;cussj.ons ul ls cront  u rn l ican t  r c a u l t  i n  tho acceutance of a - 
e n t  of conccr11 t o  tile Cantre. thcue d i scuss ia l~s  ohould be followed 
throw.rh t o  &o explicit h c  implications i n  terms of a c t i v i t i e s  and 
b\rd,yct o l l o c n t i o z .  
The Andean Pact p ro jec t  i l l u o t r a t e s  a problem area t h a t  may be 
reasonably ecneral  with such typos of project. The c lo se r  one moves 
from research p e r  SQ towards the  p r a c t i c a l i t i e s  of policy-formulation 
and p l m i n g ,  the more precroing and dominant a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be shorter-  
run and day-to-dny concerns. This is l i k e l y  t o  be eo even without 
the  type of p o l i t i c a l  context which, as i n  the  caee of the  Andean Pact ,  
re in forces  a concern with rapid r e su l t s .  Ac t iv i t i e s  with lower-term 
implications,  f o r  example diagnost ic  rescaroh, are l i k e l y  t o  receive 
lower p r io r i t y .  Yet t he  h i s to ry  of t he  whole Andean Pact project  a l s o  
demonstrates the value of such longer-term diagnostic research 
ac t i v i t y .  
We dlould note,theref ore-that . when a project  ( o r  pronosal) contains 
a colnbjnation of work wi t !>  long and nhort-run irnpl5cationa. i t  m w  
he deni ro l~ le  1;o try t o  tokc - act ions  which w i l l  he lp  firant r ec ip i en t s  
ca r ry  out the  former whilo m o i n t i n a i n ~  t h e i r  p r i o r i t y  concern with 
the  l a t t e r .  I n  p a c t i c e ,  t h i s  may involve an attempt t o  f i n d  soma 
mechanism which w i l l  a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y  insu la te  the longep-term work from 
the  pressure of short-term objectives, while a t  the  same time maintaini~:. 
t h e  l inkage between t h e  more 'academic' research and the p r a c t i c a l i t i e s  
and r e a l i t i e s  of planning and policy-formulation. I n  the pa r t i cu l a r  
case of t h e  Andean Pact ,  some form of sub-contracting mechanism 
mieht have been suggested t o  avoid discontinuing the  two research 
pro jec t s  with r e l a t i v e l y  long-term implications. 
( f )  One fea ture  of the  Andean Pact p ro jec t  makes i t  unique among 
Centre-supported Technology Pol icy  Projects. However, this f e a t w e  
may become moro common. The pro jec t  W a s  n e i t he r  a network pro jec t  
with research groups from d i f f e r en t  countr ies  cooperating i n  the  work; 
nor  was i t  a single-country project  \ d t h  s ign i f ican t  inplictr t ions 
f o r  other  countries.  The work was car r ied  out cen t r a l l y  by a s ing le  
i n s t i t u t i o n  'on behalf o f t  a number of countrieo. I n  t h e  previous 
sect ion v!c n o t ~ d  vul.iouu .c::p*cts o f  t h o  decree of c e n t r ~ ] i ~ : , l i ~ , .  i ,  
the c ~ o c u t i c ~ n  c:f a ;rrojcct \:iiic!l 111 t i u 3 t ~ l y  required ~tctihl, ;-1; t-, 
n n t i o n ~ l  1avi:l. I n  cocr.! rc~pcct : ;  \;(? Lolievc: t ha t  i t  would I\..,vc: t;,t!i 
desir-rible i i '  i i l ~  1;ro;j~cl;. 1l:rd involvod u c r c a t e r  degree of d~ccntl . . ; l ;~~:,  1, 
o r  ut  1~3:;t lli 11k:~~:o c i  t l ~  .Lh\? ~c io l l ce  und technolo&y policy grouFs 
o p c r u t i n ~  a t t11c ri:itj.on!tl level.  
It may well bn qu i te  n a t ~ i r n l  fo r  such central ised research and 
plru~ning groups - prliapr: espscictlly newly created groups - t o  
emphaoiue cen t r~ l l i sn t ion  a t  the  expense of decentral isat ion and wider 
involvement. When respuniing Lo gran t  appl icat ions  from such 
cen t ra l i sed  i n s t i t u t i o n s  concerned with research-based policy 
foruulation,* we ohould take note of t h i s  experience. Where 
appropriate i t  would seem dooirable t o  oncouraEe crhnt  applicants 
t o  build exp l i c i t  o c t i v i t i e o  i n t o  t h e i r  propo~ed work progranme 
i n  order t o  counteract the tendency towards overcentralisatian.  
(g) I n  the  previous sec t ion  we noted t h a t  the  Andean Pact Croup had 
not  yet  adopted a systematic procedure f o r  monitoring the 
developmental impact of the implementation of t h e i r  po l ic ies  and 
plmo. Nor did t h e i r  current research a c t i v i t i e s  seem t o  
incorporate elernents t h a t  would be valuable contributions t o  any 
re t rospect ive cvtrluation of 'impact' d d c h  might be carr ied out  a t  
a fu tu re  date. We believe tha t  such a c t i v i t i e s  would be extremely ' 
valuable components of cLny pro ec t  t h a t  was (a) operating over a 
r e l a t i v e l y  long period, and ( b j  operating close t o  the  s tage of 
act ion and implementcltiol~. In general  we believe t h a t  elements of 
impact-monitoring work can be very much more usefu l  than 
re t rospect ive levaluntionol - at  the very l e a s t  they can be very 
valuable comp1erneni;s t o  euch ex mst assessments. 
We suggest t h ~ t  llc Centre should bear t h i s  i n  mind i n  connection 
with any s imi la r  p ro jec t s  i n  t h e  future .  It is,  of course, seldom 
possible t o  predict  a t  the  start of a project  whether euch an 
a c t i v i t y  w i l l  be valuable. Ilowever, i t  would probably be desirable  
i f  i n i t i a l  proposals f o r  action-related work a t  l e ~ s t  carr ied some 
reference t o  the poss ib i l i t y  of undertaking such work. A t  t he  same 
time, t he  Centre should stand r e ~ d y  t o  encourage and support such 
work should it appear t o  be valuable. 
(h) I n  the previous sec t ion  we noted t h a t  i t  might have been desirable  
t o  maintain a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  type of c lo se r  contact  between the 
Centre and the group carrying i t  out. This has broader irnplicationa 
f o r  the avai labi l . i ty  of s t ~ f f  time t o  develop and maintain such 
contacts.  Nevertheless, ve believe tha t  the  a l loca t ion  of Centre 
resources t o p m i t  adequate  non nit or in^ t o  take place, p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i n  long cornp1.e~ r?rojec*l;s of t h i s  type would be amply repaid 
by the benef i ts  t o  both par t iee  t o  the contract. 
* In  some respects  the  major in te rna t iona l  centres  of  ae r i cu l tu ra l  research 
have incurred t h i s  type of cr i t ic ism.  
(i) The attlff of the > . R ~ ~ ! ~ L I I  Pnct C ~ ~ I J  reco~r1isc.d the  Contribution 
t h a t  they c c ~ l d  e ~ k c  to  the dcvoloprnent of tccl~noloey policy rc.ac:.rc:. 
tind for~ul ! - t ion  i n  tkl; Tj~ i rd  Uorld outside the Pact region. ~ h s y  
a180 rcc.o;-iaeJ Ifi::,? ' 3  t:idc'r rc?oponuibil i t ies and obl igat ion3 i n  
t h i s  rcsp"". 7I;l.c ::.::!::s-.: :~houltl continue t!r.ece discussions and 
p r~ceod  f'rc.: 5.;.rbr r c  : . i:e -vr: i l :~tle.  i n  ~DDI-opr ie te  ways. t o  a ~ L d i  I: 
audirr,?? 4.t.:. *:'-. ;. . , i: c:::,~3~ierlc:c nnd result.? of the  Rroup. 
blr;f-djl! ;..; l c a m  nLoui; the  reviow procedure i t s e l f  tha t  was used 
in t1.i: c:: a? I t  k!uu ce r t a in ly  preferable f o r  both pa r t i e s  t o  t h e  
pl-occdura 11.:i.d i n  Phauc I. Obviously i t  wus l imited,  and what we 
c;:n 1rr;r.r. I'ron i t  i e  correopondingly limited. We believe t h a t  the 
cvc.l.rill coz k-c-f f ectiveness of tho exercise  might have been higher 
jAcrd i t  incorporated a component which discuseed the  Pro jec t  more 
r y o t c f i ~ t i c ~ l l y  &t t h e  l eve l  Of the  member a t a t e s  involved i n  the  
p ~ c t  - but only s l i g h t l y  i n  the  Project .  I n  addi t ion,  we believe 
ttiat i t  would have been useful  if the exerciae had been less 
c.xclusively office-based. Our understanding of the work would have 
been much enhanced i f  we had had t h e  opportunity even f o r  glimpses 
of tho r e a l i t i e s  ly ing behind the paper-work. 
k'hether e i t h e r  of these addi t iona l  components would have s ign i f ican t ly  
changed our aeeessment, we cannot say. They would probably have 
added t o  what we have learned. However, once again,  the  implications 
f o r  Centre s t a f f  time a r e  not  t r i v i a l ,  and we believe t ha t  the  
exercise,  a s  i t  was, was valuable and usefu l  t o  the Centre. 
